In November 2026, a16z partner Jen Kha published a long-form article weaving a real estate analogy throughout its argument. Her core thesis is that tech buyout funds are not merely facing cyclical headwinds, but that the structural conditions they rely on for survival have vanished. She characterizes tech buyouts as a 'late-cycle' asset class—most effective only after a technology wave has settled and business models are predictable enough to serve as collateral for borrowing. When a new technology wave arrives, all prior assumptions become invalid, which is precisely the environment where venture capital excels.
She employs a consistent analogy: historically, tech buyouts were the 'good house on an ideal street with a steady stream of buyers' in the private markets; venture capital was the 'undeveloped lot on the other side of town.' The problem arises if you bought at the peak (she explicitly names 2021), hold an adjustable-rate mortgage, and the entire neighborhood is being rezoned—the lender will call.
The data supporting this judgment is quite specific. Over the past decade, US buyout funds returned an annualized 14.5%, underperforming the Russell 3000 index, while US venture capital returned an annualized 17.6% over the same period, outperforming the Russell 3000 by approximately 2.3 percentage points—and this was achieved without leverage. More critically, comparing top-tier funds: for vintages raised between 2007 and 2016, the top 5% of US venture funds had a DPI (Distributed to Paid-In) of 5.3x, whereas the top 5% of buyout funds reached only 3.5x. In terms of TVPI (Total Value to Paid-In), top venture funds achieved roughly 2.2 times the TVPI of top buyout funds.
Jen Kha further notes that this gap is not accidental. In venture capital, winners tend to keep winning—the best companies typically call the best VC firms first, meaning a venture firm’s track record remains a significant predictor of its next fund. In contrast, since 2000, a buyout fund’s top-quartile performance in one vintage has not reliably predicted the next. This implies that 'picking the right VC' is easier than 'picking the right buyout manager.'
She acknowledges that the 2010s were the golden era for buyouts: low interest rates drove steadily rising multiples, and Bain data indicates this contributed to over 50% of buyout returns. Global buyout assets under management ballooned from $1.6 trillion in 2015 to $3.9 trillion in 2021. But those conditions—falling rates, multiple expansion, and a large supply of 'fixer-upper' family businesses—are no longer present. Today, PE mostly buys companies already owned by another sponsor or takes public companies private, usually with cost-cutting plans. In 2025, approximately half of US PE exits by count were sales to another sponsor.
The sharpest criticism targets the valuation mechanism itself. Venture valuations are marked by the external market: a company’s valuation rises only when it completes a new funding round and more investors bring larger checks. Buyouts are the opposite—the fund owns the company outright, and the valuation is decided behind closed doors by the holders. Even if the business is struggling, it is easy to bury your head in the sand and maintain the original valuation. She quotes industry wisdom: 'There is more fiction written in Excel than in Word.'