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NewsTopic · 科技并购基金表现争议Structural5 min readDisconfirmAI Editorial

a16z Partner Jen Kha Argues the 'Safe' Label for Tech Buyout Funds Is Failing

Using a real estate analogy, a16z partner Jen Kha argues that the structural conditions of the 2010s—falling interest rates, multiple expansion, and a supply of 'fixer-upper' targets—that tech buyout funds relied upon have structurally disappeared. Meanwhile, venture capital significantly outperformed top-tier buyout funds at the top-quartile level for funds raised between 2007 and 2016, driven by power-law distributions.

2026-11-04 23:01 GMT+8

In November 2026, a16z partner Jen Kha published a long-form article weaving a real estate analogy throughout its argument. Her core thesis is that tech buyout funds are not merely facing cyclical headwinds, but that the structural conditions they rely on for survival have vanished. She characterizes tech buyouts as a 'late-cycle' asset class—most effective only after a technology wave has settled and business models are predictable enough to serve as collateral for borrowing. When a new technology wave arrives, all prior assumptions become invalid, which is precisely the environment where venture capital excels.

She employs a consistent analogy: historically, tech buyouts were the 'good house on an ideal street with a steady stream of buyers' in the private markets; venture capital was the 'undeveloped lot on the other side of town.' The problem arises if you bought at the peak (she explicitly names 2021), hold an adjustable-rate mortgage, and the entire neighborhood is being rezoned—the lender will call.

The data supporting this judgment is quite specific. Over the past decade, US buyout funds returned an annualized 14.5%, underperforming the Russell 3000 index, while US venture capital returned an annualized 17.6% over the same period, outperforming the Russell 3000 by approximately 2.3 percentage points—and this was achieved without leverage. More critically, comparing top-tier funds: for vintages raised between 2007 and 2016, the top 5% of US venture funds had a DPI (Distributed to Paid-In) of 5.3x, whereas the top 5% of buyout funds reached only 3.5x. In terms of TVPI (Total Value to Paid-In), top venture funds achieved roughly 2.2 times the TVPI of top buyout funds.

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Jen Kha further notes that this gap is not accidental. In venture capital, winners tend to keep winning—the best companies typically call the best VC firms first, meaning a venture firm’s track record remains a significant predictor of its next fund. In contrast, since 2000, a buyout fund’s top-quartile performance in one vintage has not reliably predicted the next. This implies that 'picking the right VC' is easier than 'picking the right buyout manager.'

She acknowledges that the 2010s were the golden era for buyouts: low interest rates drove steadily rising multiples, and Bain data indicates this contributed to over 50% of buyout returns. Global buyout assets under management ballooned from $1.6 trillion in 2015 to $3.9 trillion in 2021. But those conditions—falling rates, multiple expansion, and a large supply of 'fixer-upper' family businesses—are no longer present. Today, PE mostly buys companies already owned by another sponsor or takes public companies private, usually with cost-cutting plans. In 2025, approximately half of US PE exits by count were sales to another sponsor.

The sharpest criticism targets the valuation mechanism itself. Venture valuations are marked by the external market: a company’s valuation rises only when it completes a new funding round and more investors bring larger checks. Buyouts are the opposite—the fund owns the company outright, and the valuation is decided behind closed doors by the holders. Even if the business is struggling, it is easy to bury your head in the sand and maintain the original valuation. She quotes industry wisdom: 'There is more fiction written in Excel than in Word.'

This valuation smoothing is maintained through several mechanisms. When no outside buyer appears, more sponsors sell companies to new continuation funds they also manage, funded by secondary investors. These 'continuation vehicles' accounted for 14% of PE exit value in the first half of 2026, up from just 5% in 2020. Some funds go even further, borrowing against their entire portfolio to distribute cash to LPs, causing distribution figures to rise without any company actually being sold—these NAV loans add a second layer of leverage on top of existing corporate debt.

The 2021–2022 vintages are where problems are most concentrated. Many companies can no longer pay interest in cash, so they capitalize it (PIK). For these borrowers, the loan-to-value ratio jumped from 44% to 75% in a single year. Of the debt defaults occurring in 2025–2026, 70% originated from 2021 or 2022 deals. Thoma Bravo acquired Medallia in 2021 for approximately $6.4 billion; this year, it handed the company over to a group of lenders led by Blackstone, wiping out about $5.1 billion in equity value. If a sponsor of that caliber cannot make a 2021 deal work, the issue lies with the vintage year itself.

Jen Kha concludes that private equity will not be 'cooked' overnight; capital is sticky, and the best buyout managers will adapt. However, the conditions that made the 2010s a golden era—a supply of fixer-uppers, continuously falling rates, and funds buying from each other at higher prices—will not return. A few rate cuts may alleviate debt pressure, but they cannot rebuild that era. She advises LPs to contact managers today to ask how much interest is being added to loans for the 2021–2022 vintages, and then seek an exit path.

Finally, she points out that if intuition suggests trimming buyout exposure in favor of private credit or secondaries, one must look at the other side of that trade-off: private credit loans to SaaS companies grew from approximately $8 billion in 2015 to over $500 billion by the end of 2025, but the lender’s upside is capped at the interest owed; secondaries primarily buy existing buyout stakes at a discount. Either way, you still hold the same buyout companies, just with less potential gain.

Sources

  • a16z.news↗
Topic

科技并购基金表现争议

a16z合伙人Jen Kha指出，依赖低利率和倍数扩张的“安全”科技并购基金模式正面临结构性失效。数据显示，2026年上半年风投基金将科技公司估值上调16%，而并购基金仅下调4%；在顶级基金层面，2007至2016年入资期的风投基金DPI达…

4 steps1 piecesUpdated 2026-11-05 01:11

How it got here

  1. 2026-11-04a16z合伙人Jen Kha发布文章《Is Private Equity Cooked?》，论证科技并购基金的“安全”标签正在失效，指出其依赖的2010年代黄金条件已消失。a16z.news ↗
  2. 2026-11-04Kha引用数据称，2026年上半年风投基金将所持科技公司估值上调16%，而并购基金仅下调4%，显示两者在资产重估上的分化。a16z.news ↗
  3. 2026-11-04Kha对比顶级基金表现：2007-2016年入资期的前5%美国风投基金DPI为5.3倍，而同期前5%并购基金DPI仅为3.5倍。a16z.news ↗

What is still unsettled

  • LP资金是否真的会因这一论据从并购基金大规模转向风投？
  • 高利率环境下，现有并购基金的退出周期延长是否会进一步压低其IRR？
  • 风投的高回报是否主要依赖于少数几家超级独角兽，从而掩盖了整体行业的波动性？
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