In June 2026, when AlixPartners took control of Shimao Group’s 1,219-room hotel complex in Tung Chung, Hong Kong, it faced not just a building to be sold, but an active hospitality business. Una Ge, a managing director at AlixPartners serving as joint receiver, told the South China Morning Post that the mandate was to protect this live hotel operation from liabilities linked to Shimao’s broader debt while managing a transaction involving more than 1,000 contracts. Ultimately, the asset package, comprising the Sheraton Hong Kong Tung Chung Hotel and the Four Points by Sheraton, was sold to Oceanfront Hong Kong, controlled by Malaysia’s ParkCity Group, for HK$2.7 billion (approximately US$344 million). This represents a 40% discount against the HK$4.5 billion syndicated loan facility.
However, Ge emphasized that the core of the deal was not 'selling buildings to pay down debt.' The receiver team coordinated with Marriott International to ensure uninterrupted hotel operations even before formal court orders were issued.
Hotels are operating businesses, not passive real estate assets.
Maintaining 'business as usual' is critical for prospective buyers and for lenders deciding whether to support the sale.
Specific operational steps included working with Eversheds Sutherland and Marriott’s regional M&A team to draft two interconditional agreements separating physical assets from operating entities, allowing the Malaysian buyer to assume control without inheriting Shimao’s wider corporate debt; novating more than 1,000 commercial agreements and securing consents under Marriott’s long-term management contract; and directly managing the adjacent T Bay shopping mall by renewing retail leases, upgrading signage, and launching guest-discount programs. Ge stated that monthly hotel revenue posted year-on-year gains throughout the entire sale process.
The return on these efforts was evident during the bidding phase. The tender attracted formal interest from buyers across nine markets, including mainland China, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Australia, Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. Following the initial tender, the receivers asked shortlisted parties to revise their terms, and all submitted higher offers. Ge said that decisions in such processes are not based solely on price; execution certainty, financing commitments, and board approvals also carry significant weight.
From a broader perspective, Shimao initially sought between HK$6 billion and HK$6.5 billion for the two hotels in 2023, lowering its expectations to HK$4.5 billion late last year, before finally settling at HK$2.7 billion. This discount magnitude reflects the steep concessions banks are making to reduce balance-sheet pressure and limit provisioning. The gap between Shimao’s initial seek of HK$6 billion and the final HK$2.7 billion also illustrates that even with operational preservation, asset prices remain constrained by overall liquidity in a frozen market.
As a restructuring veteran with 18 years of experience, Ge pointed out that while the legal tools available to advisers remain broadly unchanged, the scale of Chinese developer defaults has expanded the network of offshore stakeholders beyond anything seen in previous cycles. Shimao demonstrated cooperation during the receivership—proactively providing information and agreeing to confirm in Hong Kong Stock Exchange disclosures that the hotels would continue normal operations—which is uncommon in offshore receiverships. Ge noted that most borrowers resist creditor enforcement.