The core judgment of Aswath Damodaran, a finance professor at New York University's Stern School of Business, is that the broad trade of buying any AI company to make money over the past few years is coming to an end. His basis is not a single stock price fluctuation, but a structural assessment—that the four categories of participants in the AI industry chain are parting ways in terms of their business models, revenue timing, and interest directions.
Damodaran splits the AI ecosystem into four groups: suppliers (chipmakers, power equipment providers, real estate firms, etc., selling infrastructure raw materials to builders); builders (hyperscalers with massive capital expenditure budgets such as Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft); product companies (frontier model and application firms like OpenAI and Anthropic facing end users); and customers (all potential individual and enterprise users of AI products). Although these four groups are collectively referred to as AI companies, they create value in entirely different ways.
The key divergence stems from time structure. Suppliers see real money first: the capital expenditures of builders become current-period revenue for suppliers, increasing their profits after deducting operating costs. Builders face the opposite reality—regardless of how reasonable the investments are, they impact profitability and free cash flow negatively in the short term, though this apparent earnings damage is masked by profit buffers from mature businesses. Product companies are even later, having almost no revenue to show before infrastructure is ready, while bearing huge R&D and compensation expenses. The customer group only forms at scale when products are truly usable and payable.
Damodaran uses the market reaction on November 5 to validate this framework: after the results of the US election were announced, the Nasdaq fell nearly 6% in a single day, and the S&P 500 dropped 4%, wiping out nearly $1.8 trillion in market capitalization from AI stocks in one day. However, differentiation had already appeared—chip stocks and electrical equipment stocks took the brunt of the hit, while hyperscale builders (four of the Mag Seven) actually achieved net growth in market capitalization during the week. Damodaran points out that if the election results imply a slowdown in data center construction, suppliers dependent on incremental construction will be impacted first, while shareholders of builders might welcome a deceleration in capital expenditures.
Deeper conflicts arise from opposing interests. Overbuilding by builders harms their own shareholders but is a bonanza for suppliers; builders want to lock out infrastructure through long-term leases exceeding reasonable useful lives to stabilize revenue streams, but this increases default risk for product companies. Damodaran argues that as AI business enters the commercial construction phase, these competitive interests will outweigh common interests, and the market will begin to pick winners and losers.
He simultaneously proposes the 'Big Market Delusion' framework: the potential of large markets combined with the overconfidence of founders, VCs, and CEOs leads to overinvestment and subsequent correction. He acknowledges that AI almost certainly involves overinvestment by builders, excessive compute commitments by LLM companies, and overall market overvaluation. However, he emphasizes that when this correction arrives and in what form is almost unpredictable; therefore, one should not simply avoid the entire sector, but rather sell portions of holdings during each correction and set trigger prices to buy back companies you believe are mispriced once the correction subsides.