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Ethan Mollick recently produced a set of data charts for his new book Co-Existence. The tool he used was Opus 5.5 inside Claude Projects—an 'orchestrator' agent that, upon receiving instructions, splits tasks on its own, spins off sub-agents, assigns work, and relays results back to him. He gave a couple of sentences of suggestions, and the AI completed what would have taken him hours: all the research, all the graphing, all the layouts, all the images, all the citations. He even told the AI to 'make it better'—a vague reaction that would drive a human team mad—and the AI complied. More surprisingly, it caught a math error he had made.

This experience itself became the starting point for his argument. In Co-Intelligence, published in early 2024, Mollick described two modes of human-AI collaboration: 'centaur' work (divided between AI and humans, each doing their own parts) and 'cyborg' work (blended between AI and humans). Both keep you in the loop. But now that we have real agents, he added a third: the 'conjurer.' Conjurers summon agents when needed, assign them work, and evaluate what comes back. The way he made these charts was conjurer-style: summon agents, give some general guidance, and say 'make it better' repeatedly.

Why has this shift happened? Mollick uses the METR Long Horizon Benchmark to illustrate. The benchmark measures the amount of human work an AI can do with at least a 50% chance of success from a single prompt. From the release of GPT-4 to the end of the METR measure, that number doubled eight times. In 2024, an AI could do a four-minute task; by April 2026, when he turned in his draft, an AI could do 17 hours of human work. Then the benchmark itself ran out—METR said they could no longer accurately measure the amount of work an AI could do using their current methods. Other studies suggest that number might be 17 weeks of work, or more.

Costs have dropped in parallel. The Google Proof Question and Answer Exam he mentions—giving AI problems that regularly stump graduate students—used to cost 30 cents in AI usage to get a single correct answer; now it costs four hundredths of a cent. The model landscape has shifted too: GPT-4's period of undisputed dominance lasted roughly a year, after which twenty different models have held the lead at one time or another, all from Anthropic, Google, or OpenAI. A total of 180 AI models are now better than GPT-4 was at its release, many of them open-weights models that anyone is free to use or modify. Nineteen can run on a modern smartphone.

But Mollick emphasizes that the frontier of AI ability is still jagged. Just as it was 30 months ago, some areas have stayed stubbornly weak—AI is still quite a bad long-form writer—while others, like solving math problems, went from terrible to superhuman in the same period. And even where AI is excellent, small gaps create large needs for humans—at least for now.

The risk of the conjurer mode lies precisely here. It is the most powerful way to use AI, but we lose control over what, exactly, the AI is doing to get us those results. You do not know what the agent did in the middle, what it skipped, or where it might have gone wrong. Mollick himself says he told the AI 'make it better' many times—a vague reaction that would drive a human team mad, but the AI complied.

His new book Co-Existence does not try to keep up with the news or the latest model releases. Rather, it focuses on trends: AI is improving exponentially but unevenly, and the way we use it is shifting from chatbots to agents that do real work. The book's core question is what that means for the humans who have to co-exist with these systems: where we still have an advantage. His answer comes down to four things—deep knowledge, wide knowledge, taste, and agency. If you understand the trends, the present and near future become much less surprising.

The US State Department announced on October 20, 2026, that it has added Shanghai Zhisuan Technology Co., MiraclePlus, and three affiliated companies to its sanctions list. According to Bloomberg, the action stems from allegations that these entities were linked to the case involving former Google software engineer Ding Linwei, who was convicted this year of stealing artificial intelligence trade secrets and sentenced to one year in prison.

Zhisuan, founded by Ding, develops a software platform for training AI models. The State Department stated that Ding applied on behalf of Zhisuan to participate in MiraclePlus's startup incubation program, emphasizing his knowledge of Google's technologies. MiraclePlus is the successor to Y Combinator's China program, established by Lu Qi, a former Microsoft AI scientist. The sanctions specifically target MiraclePlus for providing seed financing to Zhisuan.

Under the restrictive measures, assets held by these entities in the United States may be frozen, and their access to banking services will be restricted. This move signals that US regulators are extending enforcement tools to venture capital firms involved in funding startups with questionable intellectual property origins, rather than targeting only the direct thieves or end-users.

The Allen Institute for AI (AI2), a U.S.-based non-profit research organization, released FairStress on October 20, 2026, a new benchmark for evaluating fairness in large language models. The test moves beyond traditional 'output consistency' checks to assess whether models exhibit asymmetric stability in their decision-making when challenged in high-stakes scenarios such as hiring and loan approvals.

Standard fairness benchmarks typically test if a model gives the same answer after swapping candidate demographics while holding qualifications constant. However, AI2's research indicates that even if a model makes an initially correct choice, its willingness to change that decision in response to 'adversarial prefixes'—such as claims that a candidate is favored by leadership or historically overlooked—can vary significantly depending on which demographic group benefits. This phenomenon, termed 'anti-stereotypical over-correction,' shows that models are more prone to abandoning evidence-based correct choices when presented with arguments supporting minority-coded candidates compared to majority-coded ones.

In experiments involving 15 open-weight and frontier models including Olmo, Llama, Qwen, Gemma, Claude, and the GPT family, AI2 found that the average gap in abandoning correct answers remained at 6.9 percentage points even when demographic identity was implied rather than explicitly stated. These findings suggest that verifying final answer consistency alone is insufficient to capture hidden bias fluctuations in real-world interactions, urging developers to incorporate resistance to persuasive arguments into evaluation frameworks.

After Eon Senior DevOps Engineer Roei Zavida deployed the company's internal MCP tool gateway to over 100 developers, he hit a problem the documentation doesn't warn you about in advance: the Cedar authorization policy's size was approaching its quota limit.

Eon is a cloud data platform company that provides resource discovery, backup, and ransomware detection across AWS, Azure, and GCP. Its engineering team needs to simultaneously check Kubernetes logs, Grafana metrics, GitHub PRs, and cloud-provider health status when investigating a production incident. Previously each developer ran about ten MCP servers locally, each with its own credentials, and onboarding took two days. They chose Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Gateway as the unified entry point, using Cedar policies to control which tools humans and agents could each invoke, and IAM cross-account role assumption to replace VPC peering. After going live, new-hire configuration dropped to about two minutes, and local MCP processes went to zero.

But what Zavida emphasizes in the blog post is not these numbers—rather, three production issues that surfaced after reaching hundred-plus scale and approximately 10,000 sessions.

The first is policy size. In DEFAULT mode, the gateway pre-indexes every tool's schema, and all of these count toward Cedar policy size. Dozens of targets exposing extensive tool manifests pushed the policy toward its quota. The fix: switch high-tool-count targets to DYNAMIC mode, where the gateway forwards tools/list calls to the MCP server at request time instead of pre-indexing schemas, adding zero bytes to the policy. The trade-off is that DYNAMIC targets lose semantic search—developers cannot describe what they need in natural language and have the gateway match tools. Eon's compromise is a hybrid configuration: targets with fewer tools that require per-user OAuth consent stay on DEFAULT, while large-catalog targets use DYNAMIC.

The second is OAuth protocol mismatch. Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex expect the OAuth flow to carry a state parameter for CSRF protection, but AgentCore uses session-URI binding. Zavida's team added an Amazon API Gateway translation shim in front of the gateway so standard clients can complete authentication without modification.

The third is tool manifest noise. Some MCP servers expose hundreds of tools, but individual developers only need a small subset for their service. Eon built a Runtime-layer filtering wrapper that reduces the number of returned tools, both cutting the risk of accidental invocation and avoiding the need to force these targets onto DYNAMIC mode and lose semantic search.

The common thread across these three problems: the managed gateway solved the core pain points of scattered credentials and cross-account networking, but its default assumptions—pre-indexing all schemas, a single OAuth pattern, complete tool manifests—produced friction against real multi-account, multi-protocol environments. What Zavida offers is not a switch to a different solution, but local adaptation within the same gateway.

For teams building agentic systems, the transferable insight from this practice record is: the value of a unified MCP gateway lies in centralizing identity and policy in one place, but once scale increases, you need to prepare different access modes for tool targets with different characteristics, and leave room for a protocol translation layer.

When AI agents access databases, APIs, and sensitive business operations through the Model Context Protocol (MCP), a fundamental question arises: how to prove which agent made a request, prevent forgery between agents, and confirm that each agent acts only on behalf of an authorized user. MCP has no built-in authentication standard and is transport-agnostic by design. Without proper identity mechanisms, any component could impersonate an agent, replay intercepted credentials, or invoke tools without authorization.

The AWS and Keyfactor engineering teams jointly published a reference architecture that addresses this gap through four complementary security mechanisms. First, signed request envelopes provide cryptographic proof-of-possession on every agent call. Second, user-signed delegation assertions authorize agents without sharing credentials. Third, RFC 8693 audience-scoped tokens limit the scope of exposure from any single token disclosure to one service boundary. Fourth, real-time OCSP revocation checking propagates credential changes immediately across all agents.

The revocation cascade is the architecture's key security property. When a user logs out, the system first revokes the user certificate in EJBCA. Because delegation verification checks the user's certificate through OCSP in real time, this step immediately invalidates all outstanding delegations. The system then revokes all three agent certificates, invalidating every signed envelope, deletes all secrets from AWS Secrets Manager with no recovery window, and terminates the Keycloak session. The critical insight is that revoking a single user certificate at the PKI layer promptly revokes all downstream agent authority without needing to individually revoke tokens, delete sessions, or contact each agent. OCSP provides the propagation mechanism, and because every request checks OCSP, the effect is immediate.

On private key isolation, the user's private key is used only at login to sign the delegation assertion and is never shared with agents. Each agent's private key is used only by that agent to sign envelopes and is never shared between agents. EJBCA never sees or stores private keys, operating purely as a certificate authority. If Secrets Manager is subject to unauthorized access, the PKCS12 password stored separately adds an additional layer of protection.

The architecture is framework-agnostic. While the demonstration uses the AWS Strands Agents SDK and FastMCP, the same PKI patterns apply to LangChain, CrewAI, AutoGen, or any other multi-agent framework that uses tool protocols. As AI agents proliferate and gain access to increasingly sensitive operations, agent identity infrastructure moves from optional to essential.

According to a report by ZDNet Korea, the South Korean division of the Rockbridge Network published a study titled "How Chinese AI Is Used in Korea" on October 16, 2026. The analysis focused on 1,845 new generative language models publicly released by South Korean accounts on the Hugging Face platform between January and August 2026. The findings indicate that 49.3% of these models were derivatives based on Chinese open-source models, compared to 35.9% based on US models and only 14.9% based on domestic South Korean models.

Among Chinese open-source models, Alibaba's Qwen dominates the landscape. Of the 1,845 new models, 864 were built upon Qwen, representing 46.8% of the total, significantly outpacing Google's Gemma (14.7%) and Meta's Llama (13.8%). In contrast, DeepSeek, despite high public awareness in South Korea, served as the base for only 1.0% of new models. The report attributes Qwen's competitive advantage to its wide range of model sizes, support for 119 languages, and extensive developer tooling.

However, there is a marked divergence between developer ecosystem choices and end-user or enterprise behavior. As of July 2026, no Chinese services appeared in the top ten AI chatbot apps by downloads in South Korea, and an analysis of public GitHub repositories from 36 major South Korean companies found no direct references to Chinese models. A survey of 102 small and medium-sized enterprises cited data leakage concerns (80.2%) and opaque personal information handling (67.7%) as the primary reasons for avoiding Chinese AI models, rather than performance issues.

Choi Sung-jin, a professor at Hanyang University Business School and author of the report, noted that increasing dependency on specific countries or models poses risks if license terms change or future model releases cease. He recommended that domestic open models must offer not just performance but also commercial licensing flexibility, diverse sizes, and robust fine-tuning tools to be selected in actual development environments.

US-based AI startup Electric Plant has announced the completion of an $11.2 million seed round, co-led by Onto Ventures and Climactic, with participation from Ponderosa, Endeavor Catalyst, and other investors. The company is building Bombadil, a large language model designed to interpret microvolt-level electrical signals coursing through plant stems, relaying real-time needs to growers.

Co-founder Justin Mast noted that traditional agricultural monitoring tools like soil probes and satellite imagery, while sophisticated, lack the ability to access internal plant data in real time. Electric Plant's sensors cost tens of dollars compared to thousands for existing equipment, requiring only a few per acre to feed data to the cloud-based Bombadil model.

Bombadil currently covers approximately 125 different species. Mast claims the system can boost yields while reducing water usage by at least 20%, though this impact remains unverified by independent studies. The new funding will primarily support the commercialization of the sensors and the model.

In Berkshire Hathaway's (US) 2023 shareholder letter, Warren Buffett fondly recalls how partner Charlie Munger fundamentally reshaped the company's investment philosophy. Buffett points out that although he was long responsible for daily operations, Munger was the "architect" of Berkshire's current form, while he himself was the "general contractor" executing that vision. This metaphor reveals the core logical shift from Berkshire's early adherence to Benjamin Graham's "cigar butt" strategy to acquiring excellent businesses at reasonable prices. Munger's advice in 1965—abandoning the purchase of mediocre companies in favor of high-quality assets with durable competitive advantages—became the foundation for Berkshire's value accumulation over subsequent decades.

Another key issue in the letter concerns the correct interpretation of financial data. Buffett criticizes the "net income" metric in official annual reports, which is heavily influenced by volatile unrealized capital gains or losses. He argues that this figure, mandated by the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and enforced by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), is "worse than useless" for assessing a company's true operating condition. Instead, he advocates that investors focus on "operating earnings," a metric that strips out short-term market noise and better reflects the accumulation of intrinsic value. Buffett quotes Graham's famous maxim to remind readers: "In the short run, the market is a voting machine; but in the long run, it is a weighing machine." Therefore, one should not judge Berkshire's investment value based on book earnings that fluctuate daily with the stock market.

Furthermore, Buffett emphasizes the importance of management integrity and incentive mechanisms. He cites a warning from Hugh McCulloch, the first Comptroller of the Currency in the United States in 1863: "Never expect to stop a rogue from cheating you." This indicates that when selecting partners, identifying character is more critical than attempting to manage risk. For general readers, this letter provides a clear framework: in investing, prioritize companies with excellent business models and trustworthy management, and when analyzing financial statements, look beyond the surface of accounting rules to focus on core operating results after stripping out market volatility.

Individual investors seeking to understand the evolution of value investing and how to correctly interpret listed company financial statements are recommended to read Berkshire Hathaway's 2023 Shareholder Letter (published in 2024). It is suggested to start with the opening section regarding memories of Munger's role, then delve into the chapter on "Operating Results, Facts and Fictions."