Torsten Slok, chief economist at Apollo Global Management, a major US asset management and financial investment firm, recently released an analysis with the core conclusion that despite huge AI investments and high market enthusiasm, this technology has not yet delivered any measurable financial benefits to US companies outside the tech industry.
Slok’s research framework focuses on the S&P 493 index, which deliberately excludes the "Magnificent Seven" (including Tesla, Microsoft, Nvidia, Apple, Meta, etc.). His data shows that since early 2023, revenue per employee among the Magnificent Seven has risen significantly, with profit margins climbing from around 10% in 2020 to approximately 30%. In contrast, other industries within the S&P 493 have seen their profit margins and revenue per employee remain largely unchanged, aside from minor fluctuations.
Slok explains the mechanism as follows: when AI expenditures do not appear on income statements, the business community is re-evaluating the nature of these investments. In his report for Apollo, he wrote that US businesses are reclassifying token spending from a source of growth to a cost burden. This assessment aligns with a survey by Bitkom, the German Information Technology Association, where about one-third of responding German companies reported being caught off guard by high AI costs.
Facing cost pressures, some companies have begun adopting a so-called "Modelmaxxing" strategy, selecting different AI models based on tasks rather than always calling the most expensive flagship models. From this trend, the first startups automating model routing have already emerged.
However, Slok’s argument goes beyond cost. He posits a more fundamental judgment: AI may be an excellent computing machine, but intelligence in business is primarily about judgment. Judgment relies on context, and answers vary depending on the person or model asked. AI does not understand responsibility, trust, culture, unwritten rules, ethical trade-offs, or fairness—yet these are precisely the factors that shape reputation risk and ultimately determine revenue growth and profit margins. Therefore, he believes the final decision on AI development lies not with the Magnificent Seven, but with the S&P 493 companies that have not yet seen returns.
It should be noted that this is Slok’s analytical judgment as chief economist at Apollo, not an independently verified conclusion. The rise in profit margins for the Magnificent Seven may be driven by multiple non-AI factors simultaneously, and attributing it solely to AI requires stricter causal identification. Additionally, the definition of the S&P 493 itself excludes the most direct commercial beneficiaries of AI, making the search for AI returns within it somewhat circular. While Slok’s distinction between judgment and computation is a heuristic conceptual framework, it has not yet provided an operable quantitative standard to distinguish which business tasks truly require judgment versus those that can be replaced by computation.