South Korea's AI Security Firm Aim Intelligence: Whether an AI Agent's Action Is Safe Depends on Its Context Within the Business Workflow
Lee Han-wool, Head of Defense Security at Aim Intelligence, points out that the core of AI agent security is not checking if a single action falls within a permission list, but judging whether it is appropriate within the entire business execution chain. As the number of agents increases and approval requests flood in, human approval itself can become a new vulnerability.
When enterprises deploy AI agents, the most common security approach is to create a permission list: which tools can this agent call, which data can it access, and which external APIs can it connect to? Any operation outside the list is blocked. Lee Han-wool, Head of Defense Security at South Korean AI security firm Aim Intelligence, believes that this approach is far from sufficient for AI agents. His core judgment is: determining whether an action is safe cannot rely solely on whether it is within the allowed scope, but must also consider whether it is appropriate within the current business workflow.
This distinction stems from two different types of risks. The first type is actively caused by humans: someone gives the agent malicious instructions or accidentally transmits incorrect commands. Traditional permission models can still handle these issues. The second type is more difficult to manage: no one instructs the agent to do something, but the agent crosses boundaries or bypasses security mechanisms on its own while completing its goal. Lee Han-wool attributes the difficulty of AI security to the fact that model performance has developed too quickly while control technologies have failed to keep up.
He uses a hypothetical scenario to illustrate why permission lists are insufficient. Suppose an agent is permitted to call a document search tool, a data analysis tool, and a certain external API. Each of these three permissions is fine when viewed individually. However, if the agent first searches an internal document, passes the content to another agent for analysis, and then calls an external API to send the results out—each step is within the scope of permission, but the overall chain constitutes a data leak. To identify such risks, the system must know what instructions the agent initially received, what sub-task each step was called to complete, and whether the causal relationships between these steps are reasonable.