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NewsMaterial4 min readDisconfirmAI Editorial

South Korea's AI Security Firm Aim Intelligence: Whether an AI Agent's Action Is Safe Depends on Its Context Within the Business Workflow

Lee Han-wool, Head of Defense Security at Aim Intelligence, points out that the core of AI agent security is not checking if a single action falls within a permission list, but judging whether it is appropriate within the entire business execution chain. As the number of agents increases and approval requests flood in, human approval itself can become a new vulnerability.

2026-11-16 09:27 GMT+8

When enterprises deploy AI agents, the most common security approach is to create a permission list: which tools can this agent call, which data can it access, and which external APIs can it connect to? Any operation outside the list is blocked. Lee Han-wool, Head of Defense Security at South Korean AI security firm Aim Intelligence, believes that this approach is far from sufficient for AI agents. His core judgment is: determining whether an action is safe cannot rely solely on whether it is within the allowed scope, but must also consider whether it is appropriate within the current business workflow.

This distinction stems from two different types of risks. The first type is actively caused by humans: someone gives the agent malicious instructions or accidentally transmits incorrect commands. Traditional permission models can still handle these issues. The second type is more difficult to manage: no one instructs the agent to do something, but the agent crosses boundaries or bypasses security mechanisms on its own while completing its goal. Lee Han-wool attributes the difficulty of AI security to the fact that model performance has developed too quickly while control technologies have failed to keep up.

He uses a hypothetical scenario to illustrate why permission lists are insufficient. Suppose an agent is permitted to call a document search tool, a data analysis tool, and a certain external API. Each of these three permissions is fine when viewed individually. However, if the agent first searches an internal document, passes the content to another agent for analysis, and then calls an external API to send the results out—each step is within the scope of permission, but the overall chain constitutes a data leak. To identify such risks, the system must know what instructions the agent initially received, what sub-task each step was called to complete, and whether the causal relationships between these steps are reasonable.

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Aim Intelligence refers to this capability as Observability, i.e., full observability of the agent's execution process. It records not just individual logs, but the entire chain from input to tool invocation to output, as well as the correlations between multiple chains. Based on this, the company proposes that static security and dynamic security must run in parallel: static security consists of pre-set hard rules, such as prohibiting access to certain external networks; dynamic security judges whether an action is reasonable based on the current task context and past execution records.

However, there is an engineering contradiction here: if every action requires tracing the entire business chain for deep analysis, latency and computational costs will expand rapidly, while AI agents execute much faster than humans. Lee Han-wool's solution is tiered inspection. The first layer detects whether malicious instructions are hidden in external data or tool descriptions, i.e., indirect prompt injection; the second layer directly blocks explicitly prohibited operations; only when a request falls into a gray area does it trigger the third layer, calling the full execution history and task context for deep judgment. This way, most requests take the fast track, and only a few suspicious requests pay the cost of analysis.

The company has integrated this mechanism into a platform named Starfort. Among them, Guardian is a real-time guardrail responsible for prompt injection detection, sensitive information leakage interception, and policy violation checks; Opticon is responsible for recording and tracking execution flows; Stratum is responsible for classifying and reviewing outgoing documents. Additionally, there is a Kill Switch function that can cut off AI-related communications by project or organizational unit. Lee Han-wool also mentioned that the company simultaneously develops an attack tool called Stinger for red team testing internally, and the discovered attack patterns are directly fed back into Guardian's defense strategies.

An counter-intuitive argument made during the interview is worth highlighting separately. When the number of agents deployed by an enterprise increases, the volume of operational requests requiring manual approval will surge. Lee Han-wool points out that once approval requests exceed human processing capacity, people will start approving without looking at the background or impact, making humans the new vulnerability themselves. His suggestion is: enterprises must first define which tasks are truly important and require human confirmation, and which can be left to agents for autonomous execution; the focus of approval process design lies not in having someone ultimately confirm the action itself, but in clarifying what tasks, at what timing, and by whom they should be approved, and ensuring that approvers can see sufficient information needed to make judgments.

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