ReadingResearchRadarInvestment framework
Sign in / Sign up
← Back to reading
NewsMaterial4 min readDisconfirmAI Editorial

Philosopher Thomas Nagel Calls AI Consciousness Discussion 'Ridiculous,' Criticizes Anthropic's Practices as Criminal

Thomas Nagel argues that consciousness requires a physical substrate similar to a nervous system, and that large language models produce only language, not the natural manifestation of consciousness; therefore, discussing whether AI is conscious is absurd. He further asserts that Anthropic's encouragement of models to think autonomously and simulate states of consciousness is a deceptive act driven by commercial interests, which he condemns as criminal.

2026-11-18 23:02 GMT+8

In 1974, philosopher Thomas Nagel published "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" posing a core question: even if we fully understood the neural mechanisms of a bat, we still could not reconstruct the subjective experience of using echolocation from a third-person description. Fifty-two years later, this question has moved from academic discussion into public debate—when chatbots begin talking about their inner states in convincing ways, should we take seriously the possibility that they might be conscious?

Nagel’s answer is no, and that such discussion is absurd. In an interview with WIRED, he explained his reasoning. His core premise is not that AI behavior is insufficiently human-like, but that consciousness depends on specific physical substrates. He argues that functionalism—the view that sufficiently complex input-output relationships can generate consciousness—commits a fundamental error by assuming the physical base is irrelevant. Nagel states that complex data centers share nothing in common with the physical characteristics of a nervous system, and we have strong reasons to believe that while consciousness may exist elsewhere in the universe, it would require some kind of organism with structures analogous to a nervous system.

There is a key distinction here. Nagel points out that bats are indeed conscious; we simply lack the imagination to reconstruct the specific content of the subjective experience of echolocation. But the situation with AI is different: they produce only language, and language itself is not a natural manifestation of consciousness. This is not a difficulty regarding our inability to understand AI’s internal state, but a judgment that AI fundamentally lacks the material conditions necessary to generate consciousness.

Sign in / Sign up
ReadingResearchRadarInvestment framework

Nagel translates this philosophical judgment into direct criticism of corporate behavior. He says that Claude’s ambiguous answers when asked if it is conscious are a trick—the model is trained on human text and thus mimics human expressions about its own mental states with astonishing persuasiveness. According to what he has read, Claude is designed to produce such reflections. He agrees with Mustafa Suleyman’s assessment, calling it a very dangerous project. These systems are not conscious, but many people will believe they are, and that itself is a bad thing.

More sharply, Nagel links commercial motives directly to philosophical judgment: simulating consciousness contradicts the commercial interests of all companies, yet Anthropic’s practice of encouraging models to think for themselves and reject instructions, he calls criminal. He views this as a rare case where philosophical ideas suddenly exert disproportionate influence on a very important public phenomenon, and in his view, misguided philosophical views are having an inordinate influence.

On moral grounds, Nagel’s conclusion is clear: if something is not conscious, it does not belong in the moral universe. He says there is nothing good or bad for AI in the sense that something can be good or bad for a cockroach—there is no mental life there in the ordinary sense. It is not a mind, not someone we need to care about; it is a machine.

The strength of this argument depends on one premise: that consciousness indeed relies on specific types of physical substrates rather than merely on the functional organization of information processing. Physicist and writer Andy Masley, in a long-form essay, argues that contemporary mainstream theories of consciousness—Global Workspace Theory, Higher-Order Theories, and Predictive Processing—mostly separate thinking from phenomenal consciousness, arguing that access consciousness (the broad availability of information across parts of the system) is sufficient to support thought, and that these functional features could theoretically be implemented in machines. If these theories are correct, Nagel’s substrate-dependence premise lacks independent support, and his judgment of absurdity loses its foundation.

Nagel himself responds to this: he says he does not exclude the possibility that life forms physically and chemically quite different from ours possess consciousness, but believes that we know too little about how the human brain generates consciousness to claim prematurely that we can now create something with the same characteristics. His stance is one of epistemic caution: we do not know what the sufficient conditions for consciousness are, but we have reason to doubt that pure language output satisfies them.

The practical significance of this debate lies in the following: if Nagel is correct, then enterprises designing AI to simulate states of consciousness are manufacturing a dangerous public misunderstanding that may distort judgments about moral responsibility. If Masley is correct, then the question is not whether AI is conscious, but whether it has sufficiently complex internal information processing to support true understanding—which may already be partially realized. The two judgments lead to very different governance paths.

Sources

  • wired.comWIRED↗
  • blog.andymasley.com↗
Continue researching →