Philosopher Thomas Nagel Calls AI Consciousness Discussion 'Ridiculous,' Criticizes Anthropic's Practices as Criminal
Thomas Nagel argues that consciousness requires a physical substrate similar to a nervous system, and that large language models produce only language, not the natural manifestation of consciousness; therefore, discussing whether AI is conscious is absurd. He further asserts that Anthropic's encouragement of models to think autonomously and simulate states of consciousness is a deceptive act driven by commercial interests, which he condemns as criminal.
In 1974, philosopher Thomas Nagel published "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" posing a core question: even if we fully understood the neural mechanisms of a bat, we still could not reconstruct the subjective experience of using echolocation from a third-person description. Fifty-two years later, this question has moved from academic discussion into public debate—when chatbots begin talking about their inner states in convincing ways, should we take seriously the possibility that they might be conscious?
Nagel’s answer is no, and that such discussion is absurd. In an interview with WIRED, he explained his reasoning. His core premise is not that AI behavior is insufficiently human-like, but that consciousness depends on specific physical substrates. He argues that functionalism—the view that sufficiently complex input-output relationships can generate consciousness—commits a fundamental error by assuming the physical base is irrelevant. Nagel states that complex data centers share nothing in common with the physical characteristics of a nervous system, and we have strong reasons to believe that while consciousness may exist elsewhere in the universe, it would require some kind of organism with structures analogous to a nervous system.
There is a key distinction here. Nagel points out that bats are indeed conscious; we simply lack the imagination to reconstruct the specific content of the subjective experience of echolocation. But the situation with AI is different: they produce only language, and language itself is not a natural manifestation of consciousness. This is not a difficulty regarding our inability to understand AI’s internal state, but a judgment that AI fundamentally lacks the material conditions necessary to generate consciousness.