Palo Alto Networks Survey: Over 70% of Enterprises Allow AI Agents to Modify Code, but Less Than 10% Can Fully Detect Unmanaged AI Activity
A new cloud security survey by Palo Alto Networks reveals that while AI agents are widely used in software development, enterprises face significant gaps in identity management and security monitoring.
Cybersecurity firm Palo Alto Networks recently published its "2026 State of Cloud-Native Security" report, revealing that while AI agents are ubiquitous in enterprise software development, security measures have failed to keep pace. Nearly all surveyed organizations use AI agents in their software development lifecycle, and more than 70% allow these agents to modify code, adjust Continuous Integration/Continuous Delivery (CI/CD) settings, or make changes to production environments. However, less than 10% of respondents can comprehensively detect and classify unmanaged AI activity across different cloud environments.
The introduction of AI-assisted development has significantly increased the frequency of infrastructure changes. Over 80% of surveyed organizations reported that AI agents lead to more frequent cloud infrastructure modifications, yet fewer than 40% enforce mandatory manual security reviews. Additionally, only about 30% of organizations can track the complete process from code commit to deployment execution for most production workloads. Regarding Infrastructure as Code (IaC), more than 40% of organizations use AI to generate IaC templates, but only about 30% require mandatory security scanning before deployment. Data shows that during a 90-day period, an average of nearly 20% of high-severity application security issues made it into production, with the average time from discovering a code security issue to deploying a patch exceeding 18 days.
Identity management for AI agents presents another critical vulnerability. Nearly 40% of surveyed organizations admitted that their AI development tools or agents can access production cloud environments through development or deployment pipelines. More concerning is that over half of the responding engineers stated that AI agent operations are attributed to the engineer's own identity or personal access tokens, rather than a distinct AI agent identity. This makes it difficult for enterprises to distinguish human actions from machine behaviors during audits, and 40% of organizations cannot reconstruct what operations an AI agent performed, hindering their ability to confirm whether the agent accessed sensitive resources or exceeded its intended scope.