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NewsMaterial3 min readDisconfirmAI Editorial

The New U.S. Congress Should Preserve, Not Overturn, Rare Earth Deals and Shift to Bipartisan Legislation to Cement Incentives

Matteo Clavijero, an anonymous author for ChinaTalk, analyzes the trajectory of United States rare earths policy following the 2026 midterm elections: The Democratic-controlled United States Congress is investigating over a dozen rare earth deals made by the Trump administration, but these transactions involve real companies and are difficult to unwind; the correct approach is to solidify long-term incentives through bipartisan legislation rather than turning industrial investment into political retribution.

2026-11-19 19:56 GMT+8

Rare earth permanent magnets are critical inputs for data centers, electric vehicles, drones, wind turbines, smartphones, and robots, supporting trillions of dollars in downstream economic value. China controls more than 90% of global rare earth mining, refining, and magnet manufacturing, and has repeatedly used export controls as geopolitical leverage. For the United States to break this dependence requires project cycles of ten to thirty years and sustained, stable government support—precisely the core of the current policy debate.

The blue wave of the 2026 midterms has swept rare earth companies into a political storm. The Trump administration reached deals with over a dozen magnet rare earth companies through the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital (OSC), with financing packages ranging from just under $100 million to $2.2 billion. Several of these deals have been questioned by members of the United States Congress due to ties to the President’s family or his political appointees: USA Rare Earth received $277 million in federal funding and potential access to up to $1.3 billion in CHIPS loans, with Cantor Fitzgerald—a firm run by the sons of Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick—acting as the placement agent for the government deal; Vulcan Elements received a $620 million conditional loan commitment from OSC and a $50 million equity deal from the Commerce Department, while 1789 Capital, an investment firm where Donald Trump Jr. is a partner, invested in the company months before the transaction; Energy Fuels received a $725 million conditional loan offer from OSC, and its executives have been accused by Democratic members of the House of conducting insider trading prior to policy decisions.

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However, the author argues that Congress will find it extremely difficult to actually unwind these deals. Much of the funding has already been disbursed, and equity has already been purchased. OSC funds were appropriated by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, and EXIM’s charter empowers it to make its own independent deals. For Congress to truly revoke these authorizations would require legislation to cancel the appropriations and amend the EXIM charter—any such legislation would face a presidential veto. The only feasible path to reversing some deals lies through congressional investigations that uncover fraud or due diligence violations and refer them to the Department of Justice, though the legal mechanisms remain unclear; a more likely outcome is that adverse publicity leads OSC or EXIM to unilaterally cancel the transactions.

The author’s core argument is that even if conflicts of interest in individual deals warrant investigation, turning the entire batch of transactions into political retribution does nothing to help the rare earth industry. Most of these companies are genuine operators in a sector of immense strategic importance yet meager profit margins. Congress provided no support in recent years, while the executive branch supplied desperately needed capital. Even if picking winners on a case-by-case basis was not the optimal solution, it was better than having no solution at all. Congress must build upon the existing state of play rather than tearing it down.

What is truly needed is a legislative pathway. Executive branch deals cannot provide certainty across party transitions, whereas rare earth projects require ten-to-thirty-year investment horizons. The author highlights several bipartisan bills already proposed in the current United States Congress—the Magnets Value Chain Support Act, the National Critical Minerals Council Act, the Critical Materials Future Act, the STRATA Act, and the Critical Mineral Executive Coordination Act—arguing that these represent the right direction: achieving rare earth security through market-wide incentives covering both supply and demand sides, ensuring investment commitments survive changes in the ruling party.

The author warns of the worst-case scenario: Congress cracks down on yesterday’s deals today but fails to pass any new legislation tomorrow. The rare earth industry needs not political retribution, but cross-party institutional commitment—whether through demand-side incentives, tariffs on Chinese magnets, or supply-side support for firms producing in the United States—we need something durable.

Sources

  • chinatalk.media↗
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