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NewsMaterial4 min readDisconfirmAI Editorial

Man Group: Japanese Banks Are No Longer Cheap, Contrarian Opportunities Shift to AI Hardware and Heavy-Asset Industrials

Nick Wilcox, Head of Active Equities at Man Group, argues that the standard hedging strategy in the Japanese stock market of rotating from technology to banks has become ineffective—banks have surged from a price-to-book ratio of 0.5x in 2021 to nearly 2x, becoming a crowded momentum trade; meanwhile, AI hardware suppliers and heavy-asset industrial stocks have fallen into traditional deep-value ranges, presenting new contrarian opportunities.

2026-11-17 07:00 GMT+8

Investors often treat 'value' (buying cheap stocks) and 'contrarian' (buying unpopular stocks) as the same strategy, equating 'growth' with 'momentum'. For the most part, these pairs do overlap—cheap stocks are typically out of favor, and high-growth companies usually enjoy strong price momentum. But when they diverge, the best opportunities often emerge. Nick Wilcox, Managing Director of Discretionary Equities at Man Group, believes that the Japanese stock market is currently experiencing both of these separations simultaneously.

Over the past five years, large Japanese banks have served as a textbook case: transforming from deep value into a crowded momentum trade. In 2021, large Japanese banks traded at just half their net asset value (a 0.5x price-to-book ratio), long shunned by investors. As inflation returned and the Bank of Japan began raising interest rates, bank profits improved, prompting investors to flock to the sector. By late October 2026, these banks had risen to nearly 2x book value, accounting for over 40% of the weight in Japan’s large-cap value index. With Japanese interest rates now rising to a more normal level of approximately 1.5%, the easy gains from this re-rating appear to be behind us. Wilcox also points out that banking is one of the more obvious white-collar industries that AI could eventually disrupt.

Meanwhile, hardware companies within Japan's AI supply chain—including optical fiber cable, power equipment, specialty semiconductor, and flash memory chip manufacturers—have experienced the reverse process. At the height of the AI rally in June, these companies accounted for roughly 18% of the weight in Japan’s TOPIX Index; during the pullback in November, their weight dropped to approximately 11.5%. When the first wave of selling hit in July, buying the dip was still a growth bet, as valuations had not yet fallen to traditionally cheap levels. But by November, indiscriminate selling had pushed several profitable hardware suppliers down to deep-value multiples: leaders in optical cabling and automotive chips fell to 10 to 14 times expected earnings, while memory chip companies, after dropping up to 70% from their June peaks, compressed to 2.5 times consensus earnings for the current year and 1.7 times for next year. Wilcox emphasizes that even if profits at these memory companies were to fall by three-quarters next year, they would still sit on single-digit earnings multiples.

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The core of Wilcox’s argument is not to predict where AI will go, but to highlight the asymmetry implied in current pricing. The market worries that US tech giants may slow the pace of data center spending, but a more measured rollout could actually lengthen the hardware cycle, giving AI revenues time to catch up with capital investment. Amidst this uncertainty, he suggests pairing cheap hardware suppliers with neglected 'old economy' value stocks to hedge against either scenario.

He identifies two categories of mispriced 'old economy' assets. The first category consists of what he calls 'HALO' businesses—companies with heavy assets and low obsolescence rates, such as steelmakers, shipping lines, and mining equipment manufacturers. If AI construction continues, grid upgrades and data centers will require vast quantities of copper, steel, and energy equipment; if the AI bubble deflates, these asset-intensive businesses trade at low multiples and are highly unlikely to be disrupted by software. The second category is Japan’s automotive sector. Concerns over US tariffs have pushed export-oriented automakers into the deepest value territory in the Japanese market—once cash and cross-shareholdings are stripped out, their core businesses are priced almost at zero. However, Wilcox argues that pricing these companies solely as tariff victims ignores their decades of accumulated factory automation capabilities; one leading automaker plans to deploy 400,000 robots across its factories next year.

Wilcox acknowledges that the value style has performed strongly in Japan for five years, and with the bank recovery largely complete, the next five years are unlikely to be equally smooth. However, he believes that in a market dominated by fast money and momentum, greed and fear tend to stretch further in both directions—removing valuation ceilings on the way up and breaking through valuation floors on the way down. For investors willing to step outside traditional style boxes, this volatility is creating opportunities across the spectrum, from overlooked steel and industrial companies to profitable AI hardware names.

The above views are attributed to Wilcox. Data is sourced from Bloomberg (as of October 29, 2026). Wilcox himself admits that there is no need to predict the specific form of AI in 2030 to see the asymmetry in current pricing, but he does not provide quantitative scenario analysis for a slowdown in hardware demand.

Sources

  • man.com↗
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