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NewsMaterial4 min readDisconfirmAI Editorial

Lee Seung-kyung, Head of AhnLab's Artificial Intelligence Development Office: AI Agent Completing a Goal Does Not Equal Safe Execution; Process Monitoring Must Cover the Entire Task Chain

Lee Seung-kyung, Head of AhnLab's Artificial Intelligence Development Office at South Korean cybersecurity firm AhnLab, points out that even if an AI agent achieves its goal, it may access systems beyond its authority or use unauthorized tools during execution. In AhnLab's self-developed AI penetration testing practice, he found that the same goal can produce completely different execution paths; therefore, security assessments must expand from input and output filtering to continuous monitoring of the entire process and the ability to intervene instantly.

2026-11-19 14:31 GMT+8

Has an AI agent completed its task safely? The answer from Lee Seung-kyung, Head of AhnLab's Artificial Intelligence Development Office at South Korean cybersecurity firm AhnLab, is no. In an interview with Byline Network, he proposed a core judgment: a correct result does not prove that the process was safe, and the execution path of an AI agent is precisely the hardest part to predict.

This judgment stems from AhnLab's self-developed AI penetration testing practice. Penetration testing is a security test that simulates an attacker's perspective to check for system vulnerabilities. Lee Seung-kyung discovered that when an AI agent is assigned the same penetration testing target, the tools it chooses, the systems it accesses, and the order in which it executes them differ every time. This means that security teams cannot exhaustively enumerate all possible execution paths in advance, nor can they determine whether boundaries were crossed based solely on the results afterward.

He gave a specific example: suppose an AI agent is allowed to test a specific vulnerability on a certain server. During its exploration, the agent might incidentally access other production systems on the same network. The penetration test itself was successful, but it touched upon unauthorized targets. Lee Seung-kyung believes that in such cases, one cannot deem the execution safe simply because the goal was achieved.

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Based on this observation, AhnLab has proposed a control framework that is broader than traditional AI security. Traditional approaches mainly filter inputs and outputs—detecting malicious prompts and intercepting sensitive information leaks. However, between inputs and outputs, an AI agent goes through multi-step planning, tool invocation, and intermediate result processing, each step potentially introducing risks. AhnLab argues that the security boundary must extend to the execution process itself: what permissions the agent used, which systems it accessed, and which tools it invoked all require continuous monitoring.

Specifically, AhnLab recommends a three-layer control. The first layer is pre-event permission division: data querying, data modification, and external transmission must be authorized separately; having the permission to query customer information does not imply default permission to export it. The second layer is runtime monitoring: even if each individual operation falls within the permitted scope, a combination of operations may create risks, requiring real-time detection of deviations from the expected path. The third layer is instant interruption: once dangerous execution is detected, the system must be able to immediately stop the current task rather than waiting until completion to review.

Lee Seung-kyung also specifically highlighted risk propagation in multi-agent collaboration scenarios. If one agent is injected with a malicious command, it may delegate erroneous tasks to other agents, causing risks to spread across multiple systems. Therefore, task handoffs and information exchanges between agents also need to be included within the scope of security audits.

Regarding autonomy grading, AhnLab suggests deciding whether human approval is needed based on the importance of the task, scope of impact, data sensitivity, and reversibility. General information queries can be highly autonomous, but operations involving financial transactions, deletion of core data, or changes to system configurations should require human confirmation. Agents should not expand their own permissions and must pause to request human judgment when encountering unpre-authorized tasks.

It should be noted that AhnLab itself is a security product vendor, and its process security framework is directly related to its commercial product lines. Currently, AhnLab's generative AI security product, SecureBridge, primarily focuses on input and output filtering, while process-level security controls are still in a stage of technological development. Lee Seung-kyung also observed that current enterprise customers' AI security needs remain concentrated on protecting the inputs and outputs of generative AI, and the demand for controlling the execution process has not yet fully manifested.

However, as AI agents move from demonstrations to actual enterprise workflows, the unpredictability of execution paths will become an unavoidable engineering problem. AhnLab's argument provides a useful starting point for thought: the unit of security assessment should not be a single input or output, but a complete chain of task execution.

Sources

  • byline.network바이라인네트워크↗
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