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NewsMaterial4 min readDisconfirmAI Editorial

Insider Buying in Asia Hits Highest Level Since 2018: Deconstructing the Post-Panic Buy Signal with Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BBRI) as an Example

Michael Fritzell reports that insider buying in Asia reached $2.9 billion in October 2026, the highest level since 2018, and uses Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BBRI) as a case study to demonstrate the specific reasoning path behind insiders buying after panic triggered by MSCI downgrade threats, combined with high return on equity and a microloan moat, along with its risk boundaries.

2026-11-10 12:58 GMT+8

In October 2026, insider buying activity in Asian markets reached its highest level since October 2018, involving approximately US$2.9 billion. Michael Fritzell, author of the investment blog Asian Century Stocks, citing data from Smart Insider, noted that this round of buying occurred after recent declines in share prices. Bullish sentiment is present across all major global regions except the United States, with South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Hong Kong being particularly prominent. In South Korea, the ratio of insider buys to sells over the past month has rebounded to nearly 5 times, while in Thailand it is approximately 4 times.

Why should investors pay attention to insider buying? Fritzell cites academic research indicating that stocks with insider buying tend to outperform the broader market by 6%-10% over the long term, but he simultaneously marks the boundaries of this effect: it varies by market and time period, is stronger in smaller companies, and largely disappears for routine purchases. He explicitly reminds readers that this is a statistical tendency rather than a prediction for individual stocks.

The article presents the first of five insider buying cases—Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BBRI.JK, market capitalization approximately US$23 billion); the remaining four are behind a paywall. BBRI is a state-owned bank in Indonesia, and its business characteristics constitute a signal case worth deconstructing.

BBRI’s profitability is exceptionally outstanding among global banks currently. Its return on equity (ROE) is 19%, and its equity-to-assets ratio is 14%. The net interest margin reached 7.7% in the first half of 2026. The sources of this high margin include Indonesia’s structurally high inflation and interest rates, which allow the bank to lend at higher interest rates while paying almost no interest to depositors. Approximately 43% of the loan portfolio is concentrated in microloans, supported by a vast branch network that forms a competitive barrier. Some microloans are secured, some are unsecured, and some benefit from partial credit guarantees provided by the government.

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However, there are concerns regarding the quality of growth. Recent loan growth of 16% and net profit growth of 17% include some contribution from lower-margin corporate loans rather than microloans. Credit costs of approximately 3%, while normal for the microloan business, still constitute a practical drag. Fritzell also points out that BBRI benefited from the recent rate-hike cycle—deposits carry almost no cost, while lending rates are priced at a spread above the policy rate—this structural advantage may not be sustainable in the long term.

The core of the signal lies in timing. In October 2026, senior officer Alexander Yunimar Situmorang purchased US$164,000 worth of BBRI shares, precisely occurring after MSCI threatened to downgrade Indonesia to Standalone Market status (with the next decision date scheduled for June 2027). Fritzell considers this a typical post-panic buy scenario: the market sold off due to the downgrade threat, and insiders subsequently entered. Currently, BBRI’s stock trades at a trailing price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio of 6.9x, a dividend yield of 12%, and a price-to-book (P/B) ratio of 1.3x, while its historical ROE has been in the 20%-30% range.

Regarding risks, Fritzell lists three main points: First, non-performing loans (NPLs) for gold-backed mortgages may rise if the gold price stops rising at its current pace; second, Indonesian interest rates are relatively high, which may have pushed earnings to an unsustainable level; third, as a state-owned entity, BBRI’s ownership has shifted from the Ministry of Finance of Indonesia to Danantara, the new sovereign wealth fund established by President Prabowo Subianto. There is speculation that Prabowo may require BBRI to maintain high dividend payouts so that its parent company can access cash, but there is no guarantee that the high payout ratio will continue. Additionally, ROE has shown a downward trend over the long term, possibly related to weakness in the Indonesian economy.

Fritzell states at the beginning of the article that these are his personal views and do not constitute investment advice; he does not hold any securities mentioned in the article and has received no compensation from the relevant companies or platforms. The remaining four insider buying cases are available only to paid subscribers.

Sources

  • asiancenturystocks.com↗
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