Empirical Study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York: Borrowing from the Discount Window Triggers Market Penalties, While the Bank Term Funding Program Does Not Elicit a Similar Reaction
Asani Sarkar, a financial research advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, along with collaborators from MIT and NYU, used stock data from the March 2023 bank run to find that investors significantly increased their sensitivity to uninsured deposits and capital adequacy for banks after their first borrowing from the discount window; however, banks that first used the Bank Term Funding Program did not face similar penalties. The authors suggest that part of the difference may stem from differences in program terms, while historical reputation may also be a factor, implying that emergency tools designed for specific crises without historical baggage are more likely to function effectively.
How does the market interpret it when banks borrow from the Federal Reserve during a crisis? If borrowing is viewed as a signal of financial weakness, banks may hesitate to seek help, thereby undermining the intended function of the lender-of-last-resort mechanism. In a study published in November 2026, Asani Sarkar, a financial research advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, alongside Natalia Fischl-Lanzoni, a research assistant at MIT FutureTech, and Martin Hiti, a Ph.D. student at the MIT Sloan School of Management, provided a concrete answer using actual stock data from the March 2023 bank run: borrowing from the traditional discount window indeed triggered market penalties, whereas borrowing from the newly established Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP) did not.
Their method did not directly observe stock price fluctuations but instead tracked changes in investor sensitivity to specific risk factors for each bank. The research team constructed four stock portfolios reflecting weaknesses in bank balance sheets—the ratio of uninsured deposits, unrealized losses on securities, cash holdings, and capital adequacy—and then estimated the beta for each bank relative to these portfolios. A higher beta means that investors begin to more closely link that bank’s stock price movements to a particular type of risk, indicating heightened alertness to that weakness. Before the bank run began on March 7, 2023, these betas were statistically close to zero, suggesting that the market was not particularly focused on these risks. After the run erupted, the betas rose sharply. The key question was: after a bank’s first borrowing from the Federal Reserve, did investors’ sensitivity to bank weaknesses increase further?