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NewsMaterial3 min readDisconfirmAI Editorial

Empirical Study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York: Borrowing from the Discount Window Triggers Market Penalties, While the Bank Term Funding Program Does Not Elicit a Similar Reaction

Asani Sarkar, a financial research advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, along with collaborators from MIT and NYU, used stock data from the March 2023 bank run to find that investors significantly increased their sensitivity to uninsured deposits and capital adequacy for banks after their first borrowing from the discount window; however, banks that first used the Bank Term Funding Program did not face similar penalties. The authors suggest that part of the difference may stem from differences in program terms, while historical reputation may also be a factor, implying that emergency tools designed for specific crises without historical baggage are more likely to function effectively.

2026-11-17 20:00 GMT+8

How does the market interpret it when banks borrow from the Federal Reserve during a crisis? If borrowing is viewed as a signal of financial weakness, banks may hesitate to seek help, thereby undermining the intended function of the lender-of-last-resort mechanism. In a study published in November 2026, Asani Sarkar, a financial research advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, alongside Natalia Fischl-Lanzoni, a research assistant at MIT FutureTech, and Martin Hiti, a Ph.D. student at the MIT Sloan School of Management, provided a concrete answer using actual stock data from the March 2023 bank run: borrowing from the traditional discount window indeed triggered market penalties, whereas borrowing from the newly established Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP) did not.

Their method did not directly observe stock price fluctuations but instead tracked changes in investor sensitivity to specific risk factors for each bank. The research team constructed four stock portfolios reflecting weaknesses in bank balance sheets—the ratio of uninsured deposits, unrealized losses on securities, cash holdings, and capital adequacy—and then estimated the beta for each bank relative to these portfolios. A higher beta means that investors begin to more closely link that bank’s stock price movements to a particular type of risk, indicating heightened alertness to that weakness. Before the bank run began on March 7, 2023, these betas were statistically close to zero, suggesting that the market was not particularly focused on these risks. After the run erupted, the betas rose sharply. The key question was: after a bank’s first borrowing from the Federal Reserve, did investors’ sensitivity to bank weaknesses increase further?

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The results showed a clear asymmetry. Between March 8 and March 31, 34 banks in the sample first used the Bank Term Funding Program, while 33 first used the discount window. For banks that used only the discount window, investor sensitivity to uninsured deposits and capital adequacy rose significantly within 4 to 7 days after borrowing. For banks that used only the BTFP, there was no significant change in investor risk perception. The authors attribute part of this difference to the terms themselves: for the same batch of underwater bonds, the discount window offered only market-value collateral, whereas the BTFP valued them at face value; additionally, borrowing rates under the BTFP were typically lower than those at the discount window. A bank willing to accept worse terms may have already exhausted better options, or may have needed to pledge illiquid loans that only the discount window would accept as collateral—investors could reasonably interpret this choice as a signal of distress. Furthermore, historical reputation may also play a role: the stigma accumulated over decades of banks shunning the discount window contrasts with the BTFP, a new tool free from such historical burden.

The authors explicitly acknowledge the limitations of this study: it observes a small sample of banks over a handful of trading days in a single, rapidly evolving event, making it impossible to fully separate the signal sent by the act of borrowing from the actual reasons the banks needed to borrow; furthermore, the head-to-head comparison between the two tools is not statistically decisive. However, this asymmetric pattern itself carries policy implications: emergency tools designed for specific crises, with more generous terms and without historical baggage, are more likely to be actually used by banks, thereby functioning more effectively as a lender-of-last-resort facility.

Sources

  • libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.orgLiberty Street Economics↗
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