Cisco's Al Chen: AI in Banking, Changing Version Numbers, Running Backups, and Hiding the Interface Is Not Enough
Al Chen, head of Cisco's AI Observability Software team, shared at the AI Engineer conference that bank security reviews do not seek a 'task completed' status, but rather checkable evidence for the correctness of every step. He used three examples—CVE remediation, cross-region disaster recovery, and LLM judge leakage—to illustrate the same principle: passing an explicit check does not mean the problem does not exist; additional verification is required.
At the AI Engineer conference in October 2026, Al Chen, head of Cisco's AI Observability Software team, drew an analogy: his tenth-grade math teacher, Mr. Huff, required answers to be precise to the fourth decimal place, but most of the credit came from the proof process. Bank security and compliance teams are like Mr. Huff, except they hold multi-million-dollar compliance budgets. Chen's team deployed AI observability software into some of the world's largest banks, where they found that the real lever for shortening review cycles is not making models stronger, but ensuring every step can be inspected.
Take CVE remediation as an example. A platform has multiple images, each containing multiple CVEs, with different banks running different versions, using different scanning tools, and having their own severity policies and remediation deadlines. The conventional approach is to upgrade package versions or rebuild base Docker images, after which scanning tools (such as Sysdig, Wiz, Prisma, etc.) confirm the version change and release it. Chen points out this is far from enough: a changed version number does not mean that specific vulnerability cannot still be exploited in the application code. His team built additional evidence using the Harbor task framework—having agents write exploits based on the old version, attempt them on the new version, and then write tests to verify if the exploit still succeeds. Harbor can run multiple containers or sandboxes in parallel, providing multiple trials. Chen also acknowledged the boundary: a failed attempt is evidence regarding that specific exploit, not proof that all possible exploits are absent.