Chilean Loan Regulation Experiment: Helping Borrowers Understand Terms Reduces Default More Than Simplifying Products
A study published in the November 2026 issue of the Journal of Financial Economics uses Chile's two-stage consumer loan reforms from 2011–2012 to separate the effects of disclosure from those of product standardization. It finds that improved disclosure reduced delinquency rates by 13.7 percentage points (a 40% decrease) and default rates by 98%, while standardization had no overall effect; however, borrowers with lower financial literacy benefited more from standardized products.
Consumer protection regulation has long faced a choice: should borrowers be made to see fee terms more clearly, or should the products themselves be simplified directly? The two are often treated as interchangeable tools. Sheisha Kulkarni, Santiago Truffa, and Gonzalo Iberti demonstrate in a study published in the November 2026 issue of the Journal of Financial Economics using Chilean consumer loan data that they are not the same thing, and their effects may even run in opposite directions.
Chile reformed its consumer loan regulations in two steps in 2011 and 2012. The first step introduced standardized loan contracts and improved disclosure, while the second extended disclosure requirements to all consumer loans. The authors used a regulatory loan-size threshold as a cutoff to compare borrowers affected by different requirements. Because the two reforms were staggered in time, they were able to separate the effects of disclosure from those of standardization.
The core results are quite clear: improved disclosure reduced delinquency rates by 13.7 percentage points, which represents a 40% decrease relative to an average delinquency rate of about 34%; default rates fell by 1.68 percentage points, a 98% reduction. Standardized contracts, by contrast, produced no significant overall effect. The authors also found that the reforms did not change initial loan terms—meaning borrowers did not get cheaper loans—but rather improved repayment behavior itself.