Analyst Zeus Kerravala: Multi-Availability Zones Prevent Component Failures, Not Total Service Outages
ZK Research Principal Analyst Zeus Kerravala uses six major IT outages that occurred within a week in November 2026 to demonstrate the fundamental difference between availability architecture and resilience architecture. Using Zscaler’s Business Continuity Cloud as a case study, he explains the specific architectural conditions required for true fate separation.
Between November 12 and 17, 2026, six major IT outages occurred over six days: Microsoft 365 experienced a global outage lasting nearly 24 hours; Workday inadvertently connected its disaster recovery environment to production databases; the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration issued a nationwide ground stop due to router overload; United Airlines delayed flights because it could not obtain aircraft weight data; JPMorgan Chase suffered customer transfer failures due to local hardware and software defects; and Apple experienced outages affecting iCloud and Apple Pay due to an internal update. While the root causes varied—a dormant bug, overloaded routers, a faulty internal update, and local hardware failure—the pattern was identical: a critical dependency failed, and business operations stopped. ZK Research Principal Analyst Zeus Kerravala argues from this that availability architecture and resilience architecture are not the same thing. The former keeps services running when components fail; the latter keeps businesses running when an entire service fails. Most companies possess the former but mistakenly believe they have the latter.
Kerravala points out that cloud computing has caused the industry to forget disaster recovery discipline. In the financial services sector, maintaining both a production data center and a disaster recovery (DR) data center is non-negotiable standard practice. As the world shifted to the cloud, many assumed disaster recovery became the responsibility of the cloud provider; however, it remains a shared responsibility. Availability zones and multi-region designs protect against hardware failures and localized events, but these environments share software, control planes, configuration pipelines, and DNS. When a bad configuration or a dormant bug propagates, it spreads everywhere—as seen with Microsoft’s July network gateway bug, which cascaded across 74 countries and territories.