a16z Author Zane Lackey: AI Is Bringing Vulnerability Discovery Back to the Pace of the 1990s
a16z.news author Zane Lackey argues that Opus 4.5/4.6 has shifted the workload of vulnerability discovery and exploit development from scarce expert time to machine speed, causing security teams to re-experience the emergency cadence of major weekly vulnerabilities seen around 2002. Based on this, he proposes three predictions—worm resurgence, patching speed bottlenecks, and startups focused on hardening infrastructure—and offers three practical recommendations: continuous testing, AI-native speed response, and rebuilding the security stack.
In May 1998, seven hackers from L0pht testified before a U.S. Senate committee that they could take down the Internet in about 30 minutes. Lackey points out that no one in the security community at the time found this unbelievable—the state of affairs was simply like that. In 2002 alone, serious remote vulnerabilities struck foundational software supporting the Internet, including Apache, OpenSSH, OpenSSL, and BIND. Lackey believes this cadence is returning: vulnerabilities that used to appear once every few years, requiring entire security teams to drop their work for emergency response, are becoming the norm for most teams in 2026.
Lackey’s core judgment is that Opus 4.5/4.6 marks a fundamental shift in the economics of the attack side. Work that previously required scarce expertise and substantial time for vulnerability discovery and exploit development is becoming orders of magnitude faster, cheaper, and easier to repeat. The results are already appearing in key software packages that have been audited repeatedly over the past two decades—or so we thought. He illustrates the dual nature of the problem with a long-standing joke among security teams: zero-days always attract all the attention, but it is the 550-day vulnerabilities that actually cause most breaches. This joke has had a remarkably long shelf life, but now teams must worry about vulnerabilities at both ends of the time spectrum simultaneously.
Based on this judgment, Lackey proposes three structural predictions. First, Internet worms will return. Early 2000s worms exploited known vulnerabilities to self-propagate, sometimes paralyzing entire networks due to the sheer number of infected hosts scanning for new ones; this style of attack dropped significantly in the late 2000s as the Microsoft ecosystem became more secure. When AI drastically shortens vulnerability discovery and exploit development time while patch timelines lag behind, the window for worms reopens. Unlike SQLSlammer and Sasser, this round of attackers will have more commercial goals—such as stealing API keys for inference (rapidly displacing crypto mining as the preferred action for using stolen resources) and ransomware.