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NewsMaterial4 min readDisconfirmAI Editorial

a16z Author Zane Lackey: AI Is Bringing Vulnerability Discovery Back to the Pace of the 1990s

a16z.news author Zane Lackey argues that Opus 4.5/4.6 has shifted the workload of vulnerability discovery and exploit development from scarce expert time to machine speed, causing security teams to re-experience the emergency cadence of major weekly vulnerabilities seen around 2002. Based on this, he proposes three predictions—worm resurgence, patching speed bottlenecks, and startups focused on hardening infrastructure—and offers three practical recommendations: continuous testing, AI-native speed response, and rebuilding the security stack.

2026-11-16 23:02 GMT+8

In May 1998, seven hackers from L0pht testified before a U.S. Senate committee that they could take down the Internet in about 30 minutes. Lackey points out that no one in the security community at the time found this unbelievable—the state of affairs was simply like that. In 2002 alone, serious remote vulnerabilities struck foundational software supporting the Internet, including Apache, OpenSSH, OpenSSL, and BIND. Lackey believes this cadence is returning: vulnerabilities that used to appear once every few years, requiring entire security teams to drop their work for emergency response, are becoming the norm for most teams in 2026.

Lackey’s core judgment is that Opus 4.5/4.6 marks a fundamental shift in the economics of the attack side. Work that previously required scarce expertise and substantial time for vulnerability discovery and exploit development is becoming orders of magnitude faster, cheaper, and easier to repeat. The results are already appearing in key software packages that have been audited repeatedly over the past two decades—or so we thought. He illustrates the dual nature of the problem with a long-standing joke among security teams: zero-days always attract all the attention, but it is the 550-day vulnerabilities that actually cause most breaches. This joke has had a remarkably long shelf life, but now teams must worry about vulnerabilities at both ends of the time spectrum simultaneously.

Based on this judgment, Lackey proposes three structural predictions. First, Internet worms will return. Early 2000s worms exploited known vulnerabilities to self-propagate, sometimes paralyzing entire networks due to the sheer number of infected hosts scanning for new ones; this style of attack dropped significantly in the late 2000s as the Microsoft ecosystem became more secure. When AI drastically shortens vulnerability discovery and exploit development time while patch timelines lag behind, the window for worms reopens. Unlike SQLSlammer and Sasser, this round of attackers will have more commercial goals—such as stealing API keys for inference (rapidly displacing crypto mining as the preferred action for using stolen resources) and ransomware.

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Second, the patching problems of the Windows XP era will recur. Unpatched Windows machines connected directly to the Internet in the early 2000s were compromised before they finished downloading updates. Lackey argues that the AI-era version of this problem extends beyond operating systems to the entire software ecosystem. Enterprises previously delayed automatic updates for two reasons: first, the risk of update-induced failures outweighed the security risk of not updating; second, the problem is far more complex than it sounds, given the staggering amount of software within enterprises, much of which is no longer actively maintained. AI unlocking offensive capabilities at machine speed will change this calculus, forcing enterprises to patch at speeds orders of magnitude faster.

Third, a new generation of startups will emerge around hardened infrastructure components. In previous similar environments, projects like OpenBSD built their identity around correctness, security auditing, and secure defaults. Lackey expects a new wave of products whose core promise is delivering highly hardened versions of critical infrastructure components for enterprise use. While previous generations of such products struggled commercially, changes in the security landscape may unlock a significantly larger market this time.

For security teams dealing with this situation, Lackey offers three practical recommendations. First, test yourselves aggressively—not annual compliance penetration tests, but continuous, scope-free full red team testing using the latest tools attackers are currently succeeding with. He mentions tools like Hinoki Security, which give attackers access to specialized post-trained security models that bypass model refusal mechanisms. Second, the meaning of defense in depth is shifting: it is no longer just about layering enough controls so that if one or two fail, others still work; in the new environment, even if all layers function correctly, zero-days, new techniques, and sheer speed may bypass them. Therefore, teams need to deploy overlapping controls to increase detection probability and optimize detection and response capabilities to an AI-native speed level. Third, rebuild the security stack for the AI operating environment, similar to the migration from physical devices to cloud-native stacks—endpoint security is entering the agentic malware era, identity management needs to control agents rather than just authenticate humans, and open-source supply chains face exploding attack volumes due to agentic programming.

It should be noted that this article was published on the a16z.news platform, and Neo (endpoint AI security), Keycard (agent identity management), and Socket (open-source supply chain protection) mentioned in the text are all portfolio companies of a16z, which lends a commercial interest bias to the prediction that 'new startup categories will emerge.' Additionally, the claim that 'Opus 4.5/4.6 marks a fundamental turning point' is based on attributed observations from conversations with CISOs, rather than independent quantitative measurement. The prediction of worm resurgence depends on whether attackers can assemble exploit chains before the patch window closes—Lackey admits patch timelines have not caught up, but whether this condition is sufficient to support large-scale worm propagation remains speculative rather than an observed result.

Sources

  • a16z.news↗
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