Tim Chan: Why Standard Utilitarianism Fails in the 'Mind Merging' Thought Experiment
Tim Chan presents a thought experiment where merging all consciousnesses into a single suffering mind is deemed morally neutral by standard utilitarianism, leading it to choose this option for $1 charity. The article argues this reveals a failure to track subjective continuity and proposes a Markov reward process framework as a fix.
ImportanceMaterialEvidenceE3 inspectableWrite-upQuick
In "Merging Everybody Into Hell," Tim Chan presents a thought experiment challenging standard utilitarianism. Assume there is a mind fated for long-term suffering (hell) that cannot be changed. Option A allows everyone to die normally. Option B merges everyone's consciousness into that suffering mind at the end of their lives; from each person's perspective, they close their eyes and wake up as that one mind in hell. In return, $1 goes to your favorite charity.
Chan notes that intuitively, people choose A because sending everybody to hell is obviously bad and not worth $1. However, standard utilitarianism (total, average, or negative) calculates welfare by summing experiences. Since merging neither adds nor subtracts welfare units—the suffering mind remains singular and unchanged—it views the options as equal. The $1 then breaks the tie, leading utilitarian logic to endorse Option B.
This verdict exposes a flaw: standard utilitarianism aggregates experiences from a third-person "view from nowhere" without tracking what each subject continues to experience. While acceptable for linear lives, this ignores subjective continuity in scenarios involving copying or merging minds. Chan suggests the fix is to care about each perspective's subjective futures, proposing a utilitarianism based on a Markov reward process over types of experiences to handle these identity changes.