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2026-11-1113 게시물

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CoreWeave Beats Q3 Estimates, Raises Forecast, but CEO Says Firm Will Stop Unsecured Borrowing

중대
2026-11-11 21:00 GMT+8

U.S. AI cloud provider CoreWeave reported third-quarter earnings that beat Wall Street expectations on Wednesday and raised its annual financial forecast. Despite the strong performance, the company's shares remain down nearly 40% year-to-date, and its cash flow generation is still insufficient to cover approximately $41 billion in net debt.

In a blog post, CoreWeave CEO Michael Intrator stated that the company plans to "calibrate investment" based on demand, regulatory winds, and the availability of money. He explicitly noted that the firm would no longer turn to unsecured borrowing to fund its business. This marks a significant shift in financing strategy for an AI infrastructure company that has relied heavily on massive capital expenditures for expansion.

Previously, hyperscalers like Microsoft reduced capital spending due to data center delays, putting pressure on stocks of "neocloud" companies such as CoreWeave. The move toward more conservative financing may reflect a broader industry reassessment of the cost and sustainability of funding AI compute buildouts.

출처:semafor.com

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Man Group Portfolio Manager: Gold Miners Could Achieve Yields Close to US Treasuries Under a Variable Dividend Policy

주제 · 金矿企业可变股息政策争议중대
2026-10-20 06:00 GMT+8

Gold pays no interest. This is its oldest structural defect as an asset class, and arguably its sharpest today—the yield on 30-year US Treasury bonds has exceeded 5%, making the opportunity cost of holding gold higher than ever. In a short piece titled 'What If Gold Had a Yield?' published on October 20, 2026, Albert Chu, Natural Resources Portfolio Manager at Man Group, poses a direct question: since gold itself generates no income, can the companies that mine it generate income on its behalf?

The starting point for the answer is the current status quo. Chu selected six large-cap gold miners—Kinross Gold, AngloGold Ashanti, Gold Fields, Barrick Mining, Newmont, and Agnico Eagle Mines—as a sample. Bloomberg consensus estimates show that the average dividend yield for these six companies over the next 12 months is approximately 2.7%, with individual yields ranging from 0.7% to 6.3%. While this level is not low, it remains significantly below the over-5% yield offered by Treasury bonds.

The gap stems primarily from dividend policies rather than profitability. Chu points out that the current payout methods among these companies vary widely: some pay only fixed quarterly dividends, resulting in a low but stable yield; others employ a combination of a fixed base dividend plus a variable component tied to free cash flow, causing the yield to fluctuate with gold prices. Most have not yet fully transitioned to the latter model.

Profit margins provide the material basis for larger payouts. The industry's all-in sustaining costs (AISC) are approximately $1,700 to $1,800 per ounce, while gold prices currently trade just above $4,000 per ounce. This implies exceptionally high industry-wide profit margins. Chu estimates that at a gold price of $4,000 per ounce, the average free cash flow yield for these six companies is roughly 6%. Meanwhile, these companies carry very little debt, with most sitting in net cash positions. The scarcity of major new mine discoveries also limits the impulse to expand capital expenditures. Chu believes that if gold prices remain elevated, these companies will likely continue to accumulate cash, prompting management teams to revisit conservative dividend and capital allocation policies.

Chu conducted a scenario calculation: if these companies uniformly adopted a variable dividend policy based on a 50% free cash flow payout ratio, the average dividend yield could be pushed to nearly 5% under an assumption of $5,000 per ounce for gold, essentially par with Treasury yields. If the payout ratio were raised to 90%, the yield could approach 9%. He explicitly states that this is merely an illustrative example, not a prediction of actual policy changes.

However, the flip side is that variable dividends move in the same direction as gold prices. When gold prices fall, payouts shrink accordingly, lacking the certainty of a Treasury coupon. Furthermore, gold miner shares typically exhibit higher volatility than gold itself. Additionally, the dividend yields of some mining companies have actually declined since gold prices began rising in 2022—because dividends remained largely unchanged while share prices rose. Shareholder return policies are further differentiated by whether they are accompanied by share buyback programs.

출처:man.com

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Ben Lofthouse, Head of Global Equity Income at Janus Henderson: Dividend Growth and Valuation Discounts in International Markets Support Diversified Allocation

중대
2026-11-04 19:21 GMT+8

In an interview published in November 2026, Ben Lofthouse, Head of Global Equity Income at Janus Henderson, outlined three key allocation advantages currently present in international equity markets: higher dividend income, lower valuation levels, and a natural diversification away from AI concentration risks.

Lofthouse pointed out that performance in international markets is not driven by a single theme but is instead supported by broad participation across sectors such as technology, financials, and energy. Citing data from his team’s latest dividend report, he noted that the Q2 2026 report showed global dividends grew 7% year-over-year in US dollar terms. The financial sector saw growth of approximately 11%, while the technology sector surged by 20%. Given the large size of these two sectors, their dividend growth makes a significant contribution to investors' actual income, helping to offset the erosion caused by inflation.

Regarding valuations, Lofthouse observed that price-to-earnings ratios in international markets are generally lower than in the United States. He emphasized that international indices have low exposure to areas potentially disrupted by AI, such as software and online services; this means that if AI spending slows, these markets would face relatively limited headwinds. Conversely, sectors like commodities and energy in international markets have suffered from underinvestment in recent years, providing an additional source of diversification.

A notable shift is occurring in the focus of AI investment. Lofthouse observed that while the wave of AI capital expenditure has not abated, market attention is increasingly turning toward companies that can translate AI into productivity gains. This trend spans sectors including financial services, transportation, manufacturing, and healthcare. He believes that companies in these industries are well-positioned to improve future profitability through AI, representing a new avenue for earnings growth following the initial infrastructure investment cycle.

However, Lofthouse clearly identified associated risks. On one hand, the scale of AI capital expenditure is enormous, while many other industries are not making commensurate investments. On the other hand, certain stock markets exhibit significant concentration, such as in the United States and parts of emerging markets. He also highlighted the role of geopolitical conflicts in driving up inflation and energy prices, suggesting that if tensions ease, consumer sectors—which have lagged in performance—could see a recovery. His conclusion is that maintaining diversified allocation and focusing on balance sheet strength remain crucial in the current environment.

출처:US Advisor

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Janus Henderson Portfolio Manager Daniel Lyons: Biotech Pullback is Technical Deleveraging, Not Fundamental Deterioration

중대
2026-11-10 00:01 GMT+8

In remarks published on November 9, 2026, Janus Henderson Portfolio Manager Daniel Lyons stated that the sharp sell-off in the biotechnology sector following the midterm elections should not be interpreted as a deterioration in fundamental conditions. His core assessment is that this pullback is the result of broader deleveraging dynamics and technical factors, with the steepest declines concentrated in genomics, diagnostics, and life science tools companies whose valuations had been pushed higher by enthusiasm for artificial intelligence (AI), rather than indicating a fundamental turning point across the entire biotechnology industry.

Lyons pointed out that surging interest in AI-enabled drug development and personalized medicine over recent months created a clear divergence in valuations within the sector. AI-linked life science tools stocks rallied sharply through September, while many traditional biotechnology companies—including those advancing promising new therapies—continued to trade at attractive valuations. He believes the volatility since early October may help investors refocus on fundamentals and identify attractive entry points into these high-quality biotechnology companies.

This assessment rests on a historical comparison. Lyons notes that while the biotechnology sector’s strong performance over the past year might evoke memories of the speculative froth preceding the 2021 downturn, today’s landscape features several key differences. Having endured the post-pandemic drawdown and tighter financing conditions associated with the Federal Reserve’s aggressive rate-hike cycle in 2022–2023, he views biotechnology as a healthier, more disciplined sector: many companies now possess stronger balance sheets, more experienced management teams, and a greater number of commercial-stage assets than they did a few years ago. Furthermore, whereas the boom of 2020–2021 was broad-based, current valuation excesses are largely concentrated in a relatively narrow group of companies.

On the policy front, Lyons argues that the implications of a comprehensive Democratic sweep in the midterm elections for healthcare are more subtle—and potentially more benign—than the initial market reaction suggested. He assesses that Democrats are more likely to shift their policy agenda toward expanding healthcare coverage and protecting existing benefits, rather than pursuing new drug-pricing legislation. Specifically, the enhanced Affordable Care Act (ACA) premium subsidies, which expired at the end of 2025, are expected to be a priority for restoration. Meanwhile, debates regarding Medicaid are primarily focused on federal work requirements that could lead to coverage losses. Increased stability in coverage could provide incremental support for overall healthcare utilization and patient volumes.

For the medical technology (medtech) sector, Lyons sees this as a potential positive factor, given that the sector has previously operated in a challenging environment marked by strained hospital budgets and coverage losses, pushing valuations to historically depressed levels. Regarding biopharmaceuticals, he believes Democrats are more likely to defend existing Medicare drug-price negotiation provisions enacted under the Inflation Reduction Act rather than push for new legislation. This could offer some reassurance to pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, as policy uncertainty surrounding drug pricing had previously periodically weighed on valuations.

출처:US Advisor

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Singapore GIC: AI Capital Expenditure and Government Deficits Compete for the Same Savings Pool; The Reasons for Rate Increases Are as Important as Their Magnitude

중대
2026-11-04 14:33 GMT+8

In this outlook released in November 2026, Singapore’s Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) Macro & Capital Markets team proposes a judgment with direct operational significance for asset allocation: interest rates are likely to stabilize at a higher level, but why they rise matters as much as how far they go. A rise driven by stronger growth has entirely different implications for equities, the US dollar, and gold than one rooted in fiscal concerns.

This judgment rests on a specific mechanism. GIC argues that three forces are currently reshaping the investment environment: geopolitical shifts, AI technological change, and fiscal risk. These do not operate independently but converge in bond markets. Governments are expanding defense and industrial spending due to security priorities, while AI hyperscalers are pushing capital expenditure to nearly 2% of US GDP due to compute demands; both are competing for the same limited pool of savings. Citing data, GIC notes that net debt issuance by hyperscalers over the past year has exceeded the government bond issuance volume of any single European country. As price-insensitive pension and insurance funds shrink and more price-sensitive global investors fill the gap, cross-market correlations structurally rise, making stress in one nation’s bond market more easily transmitted to others.

Within this framework, GIC categorizes the drivers of rising rates into 'good' and 'bad'. If rising rates reflect higher nominal growth from AI capital expenditure, equities may perform well and the US dollar will be supported. If rising rates reflect concerns about fiscal sustainability and rising term premia, the US dollar may weaken while gold benefits. GIC judges that current yield increases are primarily driven by higher nominal growth, which is broadly supportive for equities and the dollar; however, the risk lies in the same yield rise shifting to reflect fiscal premiums and capital competition.

Regarding AI investment itself, GIC provides a two-layer framework. The first layer answers 'where to look': classifying investment targets into enablers (firms building computing hardware, high-speed networks, and energy systems), monetisers (firms creating AI-powered products and services), and adopters (firms embedding AI into existing operations to enhance productivity), with leaders in both public and private markets across each category. The second layer answers 'what to look for': within each tier, GIC focuses on three criteria—moat (proprietary data, governance over critical workflows, and products hard for AI to displace), management (leaders who tie AI to actual business outcomes rather than just cost-cutting), and momentum (early success generating better data, which improves AI performance in a self-reinforcing cycle).

GIC explicitly marks the limitations of this framework. The three forces evolve rapidly, and short- and medium-term effects may diverge, necessitating finer-grained judgments across time horizons, sectors, and countries. The impact of AI on productivity has a 'wide cone of outcomes,' with uncertainty spanning the scale of impact, value distribution, and ultimate beneficiaries. The geopolitical shift toward multipolarity is gradual rather than abrupt. Fiscal tightening is politically unpopular; the IMF estimates that fiscal tightening in 18 advanced economies since the COVID-19 pandemic is the lowest since 1990. GIC concludes with a constructive view on the long-term productivity potential of AI, but warns that a world of higher rates, higher volatility, and higher inflation requires prudence, with core principles being diversification, agility, and granularity.

출처:GIC

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Two American Century Investments Fund Managers: Data Center Regulation May Be the Key Market Variable in 2027 After Midterm Elections

주제 · 中期选举后数据中心监管중대
검증됨 2026-11-11 16:52 GMT+8

Less than a week after the Federal Reserve held rates steady in October, Democrats won the midterm elections while maintaining control of both chambers of Congress. Steve Bartolini, Senior Portfolio Manager at American Century Investments, and Miguel Castillo, Portfolio Manager, argue that this political shift does more than affect legislative processes; it alters the near-term investment landscape through three specific pathways.

The first pathway involves fiscal policy and its rhythm. The two fund managers note that election results and the resulting policy shifts could prompt the Federal Reserve to extend its pause. A notable factor is that a divided federal government typically reduces the likelihood of expanding fiscal spending. A lower probability of fiscal expansion means inflationary pressure from the government’s demand side may weaken, providing the Federal Reserve with a longer observation window to maintain current interest rate levels.

The second pathway is directly related to energy and inflation. Exit polls indicate that the war in Iran, which has driven up living costs, pushed voters toward Democratic candidates. Oil prices fell following the announcement of election results, with markets interpreting this as a sign that voter dissatisfaction might lead to a near-term de-escalation of the conflict. If this scenario materializes, falling energy prices would dampen overall inflation, providing data support for the Federal Reserve to extend its pause.

The third pathway is the most forward-looking: data center regulation. In several governor races, the construction costs, tax incentives, and resource consumption of data centers became central issues. Opponents worry about rising electricity bills, other cost increases, and water depletion. The two fund managers judge that any slowdown in data center growth resulting from this would be a positive signal for corporate debt and capital expenditure but a negative signal for economic growth. They expect data center regulation to become a primary market variable in 2027.

The conclusion drawn from these three overlapping pathways is that the economy will neither grow so strongly as to force the Federal Reserve into an extended tightening cycle nor slow down so sharply as to require rate cuts. The authors expect steady growth accompanied by at least one more rate hike in the future, rather than continuous tightening.

On the bond front, the article provides historical reference: between 1982 and 2022, across 11 midterm elections, ten-year Treasury yields rose five times and fell six times, with an average change of 23 basis points. This dispersed historical outcome itself does not constitute a directional signal, but the current supply-side dynamics—the widening federal deficit and rising interest costs driving a continuous increase in Treasury issuance—are helping to maintain higher bond yields and income potential.

Regarding inflation-protected securities, the authors believe that if falling energy prices drive headline inflation down while core inflation remains sticky due to economic resilience, a decline in market inflation expectations could create opportunities for inflation-protected bonds. This judgment presupposes that the Federal Reserve will not abandon its tightening direction due to short-term data improvements.

출처:americancentury.com

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Investment Commentator Klement: Banque de France Study Shows Swedish Government Bonds Have Surpassed US Treasuries as Safe Havens

주제 · 瑞典国债安全港地位중대
2026-11-11 15:01 GMT+8

US Treasuries are losing their traditional status as a safe haven. A new study by the Banque de France, which measured asset correlations during periods of heightened risk aversion, found that Swedish government bonds have surpassed US Treasuries in safe-haven scores, with Norwegian government bonds following closely behind. Investment commentator Joachim Klement analyzed this working paper by Burban et al. in a November 11, 2026 Substack article, noting that the findings confirm his assessment made earlier this year: investors are losing trust in US Treasuries but retain confidence in the US dollar itself.

The study's methodology involves measuring correlations between various assets during periods of rising risk-averse sentiment to determine which assets truly function as safe havens. The scope covered government bonds, investment-grade corporate bonds, currencies, gold, silver, crude oil, and Bitcoin. Klement specifically noted that Bitcoin, crude oil, and silver lack safe-haven characteristics; while gold possesses safe-haven attributes, its ranking falls significantly below most government bonds or the US dollar.

In the government bond ranking, Swedish government bonds take the top spot, followed by Norwegian government bonds in second place, with US Treasuries trailing behind. Klement summarized a general rule: the lower a country's debt level, the more its government bonds are viewed by investors as safe-haven assets. US Treasuries represent the most notable exception to this rule—despite the massive scale of US debt, its Treasuries have long enjoyed top-tier safe-haven status. At the bottom of the ranking are French, South Korean, and Belgian government bonds, whose safe-haven performance is comparable to that of Japanese corporate bonds.

Regarding corporate bonds, investment-grade bonds from Sweden, Norway, and Australia perform similarly to German Bunds or Swiss Eidgenossen in terms of their safe-haven functions.

More noteworthy is the divergence between the US dollar and US Treasuries. Klement pointed out that while the US dollar remains the asset with the most pronounced safe-haven characteristics among those examined, the safe-haven score for US Treasuries is continuously declining. This trend mirrors the situation during and after the Global Financial Crisis. In other words, investor confidence in the US dollar itself has not waned, but trust in US Treasuries as a safe-haven asset is eroding.

This finding has direct implications for asset allocation. If safe-haven scores reflect the actual performance of assets during risk-averse periods, then equating US Treasuries with traditional hedging tools like the US dollar or gold is becoming untenable. Klement believes this study provides empirical support for his March assessment: the safe-haven attributes of the US dollar and US Treasuries are diverging, and investor confidence in the two is no longer equivalent.

출처:klementoninvesting.substack.com

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Krafton Q3 Operating Profit Falls 35.5% on Event Costs, but Cumulative Results Hit Record High with Additional Buyback

주제 · Krafton三季度业绩중대
2026-11-10 15:03 GMT+8

South Korean game developer Krafton released its preliminary third-quarter results on November 10, following an investor briefing. The company reported Q3 revenue of 971.4 billion KRW, up 11.6% year-over-year, but operating profit fell 35.5% to 225 billion KRW. Krafton attributed this decline primarily to concentrated marketing and participation costs associated with the Gamescom exhibition in Germany held in August.

Despite the single-quarter dip, Krafton’s cumulative performance for the first three quarters reached all-time highs for the period. Total revenue from January to September amounted to 3.633 trillion KRW, a 50.9% increase year-over-year, while cumulative operating profit rose 13.8% to 1.1975 trillion KRW. This divergence suggests that core business growth remains robust, with short-term expense fluctuations not altering the underlying profitability trend.

In terms of capital allocation, Krafton’s board approved an additional share buyback plan on November 3, committing 300 billion KRW to repurchase and cancel its own shares. Combined with approximately 400 billion KRW already spent on buybacks and 99.6 billion KRW in dividends paid through the third quarter, the total shareholder return for the year stands at 917.2 billion KRW. This figure represents the highest annual shareholder return since the company initiated its return policy in 2023, signaling management’s confidence in cash flow generation and a commitment to enhancing per-share value through equity reduction.

출처:스타트업 생태계의 모든 것 \'플래텀(Platum)\'

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Hussman: The Three 'Free Money' Pillars of the U.S. Stock Market Bubble and the AI Profit Loop

주제 · Hussman중대
2026-11-11 00:51 GMT+8

This wave of speculation in the U.S. stock market has persisted for more than a decade. In his November 2026 market commentary, John P. Hussman, President of Hussman Investment Trust, offered a specific explanation: the bubble has not burst because it stands simultaneously on three pillars of 'free money.' The first is the Federal Reserve's zero-interest-rate expansion—from zero-interest Federal Reserve liabilities accounting for just 6% of GDP in 2008 swelling to 36% by early 2022, creating an unprecedented excess of liquidity in history. The second is the multi-trillion-dollar fiscal deficits during the pandemic, which directly subsidized corporate profits (through PPP loans) and subsequently indirectly subsidized profits as households spent down the savings they accumulated during the pandemic. The third, and most recent pillar, is the near-frantic infrastructure buildout in the field of artificial intelligence.

Hussman’s analysis of the third pillar is the most distinctive part of this commentary. He points out a simple arithmetic relationship: if corporate investment is surging, but the share of corporate free cash flow (profits minus net investment) relative to GDP has not risen, then profits must have exploded in tandem with investment. In other words, the sudden spike in corporate profits in the U.S. economy since 2022 directly depends on the frenzy of AI investment itself. This is not the narrative that 'AI improves productivity, so profits increase,' but rather a loop where 'corporations spend money on AI, and this expenditure itself becomes revenue for another corporation.'

He further uses the concept of 'dominance rents' to distinguish the nature of current profits. Hussman argues that the profit model of hyperscale cloud computing companies resembles what economists call a 'natural monopoly'—benefiting from declining marginal costs and economies of scale—rather than traditional monopolies that profit by restricting supply and raising prices. Sources of these profits include the private capture of network effects and the uncompensated use of publicly created content, which includes user-generated content on social media as well as materials used without compensation to train AI models. His judgment is that in equilibrium, if labor-saving technology depresses household income while corporate profits grow faster than the economy itself, the only way out is either for government deficits to expand further to bridge the gap, or for corporations to continuously reinvest profits into new net investment—which means the profits are undistributable.

At the valuation level, Hussman provides two specific figures. His most important indicator, MarketCap/GVA (the ratio of non-financial market capitalization to gross value added, including estimated foreign revenues), reached approximately 4.3 in early October 2026, while the historical median is about 1.1. Considering that current profit margins may be permanently higher than levels seen over the past century, he uses the GVA_PE10 metric adjusted by the ten-year average non-financial profit margin; the current level exceeds 25, whereas historically, levels associated with subsequent 12-year average S&P 500 returns of 10% were below 11. This yields a 'narrower baseline market risk estimate': a potential 55% downside when this market cycle completes. Without adjusting for profit margins, the potential downside is approximately 70%.

출처:Hussman Funds

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James Picerno of The Capital Spectator: Which Signals Will Determine Whether This Rebound Sustains?

중대
2026-11-10 20:27 GMT+8

Monday’s rally brought relief to many investors, suggesting that last week’s sharp sell-off was merely another brief pullback—a pattern of scare-then-rebound that has repeated itself over the past few years. However, James Picerno, author of The Capital Spectator, warns that it is too early to determine whether the stock market has bottomed out. He lists several signals he is monitoring and admits that the evidence each signal currently provides is conditional.

The first notable technical fact is that the S&P 500 held its support at the 200-day moving average during this pullback. This widely followed trend line is generally regarded as a key reference for the market’s long-term direction and often becomes the focal point of battle between bulls and bears during periods of heightened volatility. Picerno believes that holding this level suggests investor sentiment remains constructive. He immediately adds an important caveat, however: relying solely on a rebound from the 200-day moving average to conclude that the stock market is ready to resume its upward trend is premature.

From a longer historical perspective, Picerno notes a pattern worth observing: since recovering from the year-long correction in 2022, the S&P 500 has experienced three steep but rapid drawdowns, each of which quickly reversed. He explicitly states that it is impossible to know whether this current decline will become the fourth, but the pattern appears to be repeating. He uses a rolling five-year window model to quantify this judgment, and the results show that the magnitude of this downturn is relatively mild compared to recent pullbacks. However, Picerno’s attitude toward this finding is cautious: a mild pullback may imply a correspondingly mild rebound, making range-bound oscillation the best-case scenario for the near term—a probabilistic assessment rather than a definitive conclusion.

At the sector level, the performance of technology stocks is another key observation point. The ratio of the Technology Select Sector SPDR Fund (XLK) to the S&P 500 SPDR Fund (SPY) has weakened significantly recently, which Picerno believes may signal that the AI-driven tech-led rally of recent years has temporarily come to an end. His conditional judgment is that if this ratio can stabilize and recover, the argument that the bull market still has room to run will be strengthened; conversely, if technology stocks fall further, it will pose a significant headwind for overall market sentiment.

On the macro front, the U.S. benchmark crude oil, West Texas Intermediate (WTI), fell to approximately $85 per barrel, its lowest level since late August last year. Picerno links the decline in oil prices to the possibility that tensions in the Iran conflict are cooling—U.S. President Donald Trump recently stated that the conflict is militarily effectively over—but he simultaneously points out that such statements require a healthy degree of skepticism. In his view, only sustained calm in the Persian Gulf will convince investors that the threat related to Iran is truly receding; moreover, how much war-related inflation remains to be transmitted through the global economy is still an unresolved question.

출처:capitalspectator.com

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AI Security Firm Evolv Reports Q3 Results: Revenue Up 10%, Raises Full-Year EBITDA Guidance

주제 · Evolv AI安检公司간단한 요점
검증됨 2026-11-11 05:23 GMT+8

US-based AI security technology company Evolv Technologies Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: EVLV) released its financial results for the third quarter ended September 30, 2026, on November 10, 2026. The company reported total revenue of $47.3 million, a 10% increase year-over-year, while ending Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR) reached $140.5 million, growing 20% year-over-year. Although GAAP net loss widened to $15.6 million, Adjusted EBITDA remained positive at $4.7 million.

Looking ahead, Evolv narrowed and raised the lower end of its full-year 2026 revenue guidance from the previously issued $180–$185 million range to $182–$185 million. The company also increased its expected full-year Adjusted EBITDA from $15–$16 million to $15.5–$16.5 million. Management noted that despite a challenging prior-year comparison that included the largest contract in the company's history, the quarter achieved double-digit revenue growth with ARR expanding faster than revenue, reflecting progress toward a more predictable subscription model.

출처:sec.gov

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US October CPI Rises 0.4% MoM, Beating Consensus; December Rate Hike Odds Climb to Nearly 10%

중대
검증됨 2026-11-11 07:51 GMT+8

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released data on November 10, 2026, showing that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose 0.4% month-over-month in October, higher than the 0.3% consensus estimate surveyed by Bloomberg. The core CPI, which excludes food and energy, increased 0.3% month-over-month, also surpassing the expected 0.2%. This marks another upward trend in inflation following a significant 0.6% rise in September.

Component details indicate that the shelter index rose 0.3% in October, accounting for over thirty percent of the monthly all-items increase. The food index increased 0.5%, with food at home up 0.4% and food away from home up 0.5%. The energy index continued to climb by 0.7% after a 5.2% surge in September, driven by a 1.0% rise in gasoline prices. Notably, due to missing data collection during the 2025 government shutdown, the BLS could not publish 12-month percent changes for most series.

Following the release, financial markets quickly repriced the Federal Reserve's policy path. According to CME futures data, as of the afternoon, the probability of a 25 basis point rate hike at the December meeting rose from 0% to 9.8%. Simultaneously, U.S. Treasury yields generally increased, reflecting heightened investor concerns about sticky inflation and its impact on monetary policy. This shift signals pressure to revise the previous trading logic based on expectations of cooling inflation.

출처:Bureau of Labor Statistics

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Setting aside the yield disadvantage, Chu argues that gold's fundamentals remain strong, driven by structural rather than short-term forces. Supply continues to be constrained, and organic growth in mining remains difficult. Global money supply continues to expand, and geopolitical uncertainty keeps arriving in waves in the form of trade wars and armed conflicts. Central banks worldwide, particularly the People's Bank of China, are purchasing gold at record volumes. According to the World Gold Council’s annual central bank gold reserves survey, 89% of respondents expect global central bank gold reserves to rise over the next 12 months. The narrative surrounding de-dollarization and reserve diversification is also at unprecedented intensity.

Using gold for portfolio diversification has historically meant giving up income. When Treasury yields exceed 5%, this cost is higher than in the past. If more mining companies are willing to share their cash flows, this trade-off could be narrowed.

Lyons explicitly acknowledges that it is too early to determine how a Democratic-led Congress will interact with the Trump Administration or what will ultimately translate into concrete healthcare policy. Drug pricing will remain a political focal point, but he considers the likelihood of significant changes within the current framework to be low. His conclusion is that healthcare continues to offer a combination of long-term structural drivers (medical innovation and demographic aging) and defensive characteristics, alongside diversified return sources beyond the AI theme. Recent volatility may serve to redirect investor attention toward valuation opportunities.

It should be noted that these are the views of two fund managers overseeing fixed-income products at American Century Investments, whose interests are directly tied to product management. Their analytical framework features a checkable logical chain, but their assessment regarding 2027 data center regulation currently relies on state-level election signals rather than enacted federal legislation, representing a forward-looking inference rather than a verified fact.

However, Hussman’s investment operations are not simply a matter of 'shorting and waiting.' He admits that since gaining an insight into 'non-duality' earlier this year—that they had previously been 'discriminating against the bubbles'—their investment stance has become more flexible. At extreme valuations, all operations must have a safety net, but when short-term market behavior interacts with measurable investor psychological factors, they are willing to take a constructive tilt about 20% of the time. He gives a specific portfolio optimization example: if investors allocate between the S&P 500 and cash in a 60/40 configuration, then over the past 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years, the lowest-risk allocation matching the return of a traditional 60/40 portfolio typically assigns 33-42% to their strategy, with the remainder going to the S&P 500.

The most noteworthy aspect of this commentary for readers is not the 55-70% figure itself—any long-term bear would offer a similar estimate—but Hussman’s structural deconstruction of the source of profits. He redefines the phenomenon of 'surging corporate profits,' usually seen as fundamental support, as fuel for the bubble itself: AI capital expenditure creates profits, profits provide justification for more AI capital expenditure, and the entire loop depends on the continuous supply of 'free money' (zero interest rates, deficits, and investors willing to throw money at new technologies). His core warning is: do not confuse the sound of money being spent with the sound of wealth being created.

The greatest uncertainty Hussman himself acknowledges is timing. He states that 'the greatest investment risk at the moment is the inclination to confuse the length of time a bubble has persisted with proof that a bubble does not exist.' His valuation framework provides expectations for returns over ten to twelve years, rather than timing signals. He explicitly clarifies that their investment discipline does not rely on future market declines or economic disruptions, nor does it presuppose when disappointments will arise. This is an argument about structural fragility, not a prediction of trigger points.

Picerno’s final judgment is conditional: whether this rebound marks the start of a lasting recovery or merely a temporary respite depends on whether the market can simultaneously maintain technical support, withstand geopolitical risks, and preserve confidence in the broader economic outlook. He does not assign weights or joint probabilities to these signals, nor does he declare any single indicator to be decisive. The value of these observational indicators lies in providing investors with specific tracking anchors to help accumulate judgment basis gradually amidst uncertainty—rather than offering one-time definitive answers.