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뉴스주제 · 银行网络安全投资模型중대2 분 소요DisconfirmAI 편집부

Bank Run Threats Drive Overinvestment in Bank Cybersecurity: The Financial Stability Model by Anand, Duley, and Gai

In a model published in the Review of Finance, Anand, Duley, and Gai identify two opposing forces in cybersecurity investment: free-riding suppresses investment, while bank run risk incentivizes it. When rollover risk is sufficiently high, banks may invest more in cybersecurity than the socially optimal level. The model also distinguishes between the differing incentive directions under solvency-driven versus liquidity-driven failures.

2026-11-10 00:57 GMT+8

Insufficient investment in bank cybersecurity is typically attributed to free-rider problems: one bank's protective investments benefit the entire financial network, but the costs are borne individually, leading to collective underinvestment driven by individual rationality. In their 2026 model published in the Review of Finance, Anand, Duley, and Gai identify another opposing force—the threat of bank runs itself can incentivize banks to increase cybersecurity investments.

The mechanism works as follows: a successful cyberattack could disrupt operations and shake creditor confidence, prompting depositors or financiers to withdraw funds or refuse to renew financing. Anticipating these consequences, banks have stronger motives to prevent attacks. The authors thus identify two opposing forces: free-riding discourages cybersecurity investment, while the threat of a run encourages it. When rollover risk is sufficiently high, the latter may outweigh the former, causing banks to invest more in cybersecurity than the socially optimal level.

The direction of this conclusion depends on the failure-driving mechanism. The model distinguishes two scenarios: when failure is driven by insolvency, bank and creditor actions reinforce each other—higher cybersecurity investment leads to a higher debt burden, which in turn strengthens protection incentives, creating a positive feedback loop; when failure is driven by illiquidity, additional cybersecurity investment instead lowers the debt burden, eliminating the bank's risk-return trade-off and dissipating the incentive effect. This implies that regulatory correction tools need to be designed separately for different margins (the protection margin or the resilience margin).

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The model also distinguishes between two dimensions: cybersecurity (preventing attacks) and operational resilience (continuing operations after an attack). Stronger cyber threats tend to encourage investment in resilience, while higher rollover risk strengthens preventative cybersecurity investment. The two are complementary but compete for limited resources, requiring banks to allocate resources between protection and recovery.

For investors in the financial sector, the practical implication of this framework is: when assessing a bank's cybersecurity level, one cannot look at technology investment figures in isolation but must combine them with the fragility of its funding structure. A bank with high rollover risk may not invest in cybersecurity out of prudent management, but rather as a byproduct of bank run threats—meaning its protection levels are sensitive to changes in its funding structure, and investments may recede once financing conditions improve. Meanwhile, different banks, custodians, and service providers in a portfolio may rely on the same technological infrastructure; a disruption affecting a single critical provider could simultaneously impact multiple holdings, constituting a concentration risk that diversification cannot eliminate.

출처

  • alphaarchitect.com↗
주제

银行网络安全投资模型

【背景】随着银行对数字基础设施依赖加深,网络安全成为影响金融稳定的关键变量。Anand、Duley和Gai在《Review of Finance》发表的理论模型指出,银行网络安全投资存在“保护-韧性”权衡:增加防护投入会削弱资产负债表吸收损…

3 단계1 건업데이트됨 2026-11-11 21:49

현재까지의 과정

  1. 2026-11-09Alpha Architect发布文章,介绍Anand、Duley和Gai在《Review of Finance》上的最新研究,指出银行网络安全投资中搭便车抑制投入,但挤兑风险激励投入。alphaarchitect.com ↗
  2. 2026-05-01Kartik Anand, Chanelle Duley和Prasanna Gai在《Review of Finance》第30卷第3期发表论文,建立理论框架分析网络安全投资如何影响银行脆弱性和金融稳定。revfin.org ↗
  3. 2023-11-01中国工商银行金融服务部门(ICBC Financial Services)遭受Lockbit勒索软件攻击,导致美国国债结算中断,凸显单一机构网络故障的系统性风险。kartikanand.net ↗

아직 해결되지 않은 문제

  • 监管机构如何具体区分‘偿付能力驱动’与‘流动性驱动’的失败场景以制定差异化政策?
  • 在共享IT基础设施日益普遍的背景下,如何量化单个银行网络安全投入对整体系统韧性的边际贡献?
  • 现有的‘网络压力测试’是否足以识别出那些因过度投资防护而牺牲了财务韧性的银行?
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