Buffett's 2001 Shareholder Letter: Relative Performance and Interest Alignment Mechanisms
In the 2001 letter to shareholders, Warren Buffett reaffirmed that the key standard for measuring investment success is not absolute returns, but performance relative to market benchmarks.
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In the 2001 letter to shareholders, Warren Buffett reaffirmed that the key standard for measuring investment success is not absolute returns, but performance relative to market benchmarks. He cited the "Ground Rules" established when he founded his partnership fund in 1956, noting that "Whether we do a good job or a poor job is to be measured against the general experience in securities." This viewpoint emphasizes that long-term investors should focus on whether they consistently outperform major index benchmarks, rather than simply looking at fluctuations in book value.
Addressing the criticism that "relative performance doesn't put food on the table," Buffett refuted this through analogy. He argued that if holding the S&P 500 Index is expected to yield reasonable returns, then the advantage of slightly beating that index each year will accumulate significantly over time. He wrote: "can you regularly feast on investment returns that beat the averages, however variable the absolute numbers may be." This mindset places short-term volatility within the framework of long-term compounding, explaining why Berkshire Hathaway was considered relatively successful even if it incurred a loss in a given year (such as the 6.2% decline in per-share book value in 2001), provided it performed better than the concurrent decline of the S&P 500.
Beyond performance benchmarks, Buffett also emphasized the deep alignment of management and shareholder interests. He pledged not to take cash compensation, restricted stock, or option grants, ensuring his economic outcomes were perfectly aligned with those of shareholders. He stated directly in the letter: "We will not take cash compensation, restricted stock or option grants that would make our results superior to yours." This arrangement aims to eliminate agency risk, encouraging managers to think like owners and avoid damaging long-term value for the sake of short-term stock prices.