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ActualitésSujet · 民粹主义与经济衰退缓冲Matériel2 min de lectureRédaction DisconfirmAI

Joachim Klement: A Professional Civil Service Can Delay the Economic Damage of Populism by Approximately Four Years

Klement cites a 2026 cross-national study by Morelli et al. to explain how an independent and professional civil service can secure approximately four years of buffer time against economic decline under populist leadership by delaying policy shocks, but emphasizes that this is a delay rather than prevention; economic risks will significantly intensify after populist leaders win a second term.

2026-10-23 14:00 GMT+8

In his investment newsletter, Joachim Klement offers a practical judgment for political risk assessment: following the election of a populist leader, an independent and professional civil service can delay economic downturns by approximately four years. This conclusion stems from a 2026 cross-national study by Massimo Morelli and colleagues, which examined the differential impact of populist leaders on economies in countries with varying bureaucratic quality. Klement also references a 2023 study indicating that populist leaders typically cost the economy about 10% of GDP over 15 years—a heavy burden particularly for Western European nations already struggling with sluggish growth due to demographic pressures.

Morelli et al. divided the sample countries into high and low groups based on their bureaucracy scores. This score does not measure the size of the civil service but is derived from three indicators in the V-Dem Democracy Database: rigorous and impartial administration, merit-based recruitment systems, and remuneration protections for civil servants. In other words, it measures the independence and professionalism of the civil service rather than its sheer scale. This distinction is crucial for investors, as a bloated but non-independent bureaucracy does not offer equivalent protection.

The results show that countries with a professional and independent civil service can delay economic decline by approximately four years after the election of a populist leader. Klement stresses that this protection is a delay, not a prevention—economic downturns eventually set in even in countries with the highest bureaucratic quality. However, the key lies in the time window: if the populist leader steps down after a single term, the four-year buffer may be sufficient to avoid the worst economic consequences. Yet, once a populist wins a second term, the situation becomes dangerous.

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For investors, this mechanism provides a specific dimension for political risk assessment: when a populist leader takes office, the quality of the country's civil service determines whether economic damage manifests immediately or if there is an observation window of approximately four years. Klement’s own stance is noteworthy—he admits he is not a fan of civil servants but believes they may serve as the last line of defense for the economy in the current political climate. The boundaries of this judgment are as follows: the study is based on historical cross-national data, the four-year figure is an estimate from the international sample, and actual timelines will vary depending on a specific country’s institutional resilience, the radicalism of the populist leader’s policies, and external shocks.

Sources

  • klementoninvesting.substack.com↗
Sujet

民粹主义与经济衰退缓冲

【背景】自2016年欧洲民粹主义风潮兴起以来,学界一直关注其对经济的长期损害。最新研究指出,独立且专业的公务员体系并非万能药,但能发挥关键的“缓冲器”作用。

4 étapes1 piècesMis à jour 2026-11-02 09:06

Comment on en est arrivé là

  1. 2016-12-06福建日报报道奥地利总统选举中右翼民粹候选人落败及意大利总理伦齐辞职,指出民粹主义与建制派博弈重塑欧洲政治生态。news.ifeng.com ↗
  2. 2016-12-18人民日报刊文警惕民粹主义与极端民族主义合流,分析其源于中产阶级萎缩与贫富分化,并引用麦肯锡数据指出发达国家多数家庭收入停滞。news.ifeng.com ↗
  3. 2024-01-01Bellodi, Morelli & Vannoni在《美国政治科学杂志》发表研究,利用意大利8000多个市镇数据证明民粹市长导致官僚体系专业化程度下降及财政纪律松弛。economics.unibocconi.eu ↗

Ce qui reste non résolu

  • 除了‘推迟’效应,是否存在证据表明高质量文官体系能完全抵消民粹政策的负面外部性?
  • 在民粹领导人成功连任的情况下,文官体系的抵抗能力是否会因人员清洗而彻底崩溃?
  • 该模型是否适用于非欧盟或不同政治体制下的民粹主义经济体?
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