San Francisco broke ground on the Golden Gate Bridge in 1933, opening it to traffic four years later at a cost of $35 million. In the same city, a 150-square-foot public restroom containing one metal toilet and a baby changing station had a budget of $1.7 million and took over two years to complete. Even after accepting a donated modular restroom and pro bono engineering design, the project ultimately cost taxpayers approximately $200,000, because the donated toilet still required sign-off from more than six agencies, including the Arts Commission.
This contrast is not an isolated example—the same story repeats itself across the country.
In this article published on November 9, 2026, Matt Cronin, editor of the a16z American Dynamism column, uses this contrast as the starting point for his core argument: America has not lost its ability to build, but has buried that capacity under meaningless procedures. His judgment is that the problem lies with procedure, not the democratic system, nor environmental standards themselves.
The article first dismisses two popular explanations. The first suggests that democracy itself is the cost—that too many voices lead to inefficiency. Cronin rebuts this by noting that history is full of examples of authoritarian states failing miserably at industrial projects. China, the benchmark for authoritarian industrialization, produces ghost cities and industrial overcapacity. What truly enables democracies to build at high speed is clear attribution of power, standardized requirements, predictable financing, competent agencies, and rules that force governments to make decisions rather than merely create opportunities for delay. After the U.S. Congress established dedicated financing, national standards, and clear federal-state responsibility divisions in 1956, roughly half of the Interstate Highway System was opened within a decade.
The second popular explanation holds that endless procedure is the price of environmental safety. Cronin points out that industrial output does not disappear; it simply shifts elsewhere. China emits two to three times more carbon per unit of output than the United States. Stopping a factory here does not eliminate emissions; it exports them to dirtier producers. He uses counterexamples to illustrate this: mining permitting in Canada and Australia can be up to five times faster than in the U.S.; Madrid expanded its metro faster and at lower cost than almost any city despite being bound by strict EU environmental laws; and Switzerland bored through the world's largest railway tunnel beneath the Alps, completing it a year ahead of schedule. These countries do not value nature less; they emphasize substantive environmental protection while minimizing procedural delays.
The United States did not take this path. Instead, it combined an extremely rigorous procedural apparatus with a litigation system seemingly incapable of producing finality.
Cronin points the finger at the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Unlike substantive laws such as the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act, NEPA is procedural: it requires federal agencies to analyze and disclose environmental impacts before major actions involving federal land, permits, or financing. In 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that regulatory layering and aggressive litigation had transformed NEPA from a modest procedural requirement into a blunt instrument used to block new construction. In 2024, simple environmental assessments took an average of over a year, while more complex Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) took nearly four years. Data from the U.S. Department of Energy shows the average EIS cost is $6.6 million, and even smaller assessments cost $300,000—this does not include legal fees, manpower, and litigation costs.