Taiwanese e-commerce SaaS provider 91APP held a press conference on October 29, 2026, to release the "91APP Hacking Incident: 25-Day Investigation Report." Chairman Ho Ying-chi led company executives to apologize to affected consumers and brand clients. 91APP stated that due to the inability to confirm exactly which orders were involved, based on the maximum possible scope of impact, the incident affects 1,329 brands and 4,798,225 consumers. The information potentially accessed includes names, phone numbers, delivery addresses, email addresses, and order records, but does not include passwords, credit card details, or other payment data.
Beyond the scale of the impact, the investigation process of this incident is also noteworthy. 91APP was breached on October 3, and the following day, brands reported that consumers had received suspected phishing messages. However, the attack trajectory and vulnerability were not confirmed until October 14, with the breach blocked that same night. Why did it take 11 days from the initial breach to confirming the source of the intrusion? 91APP CISO Lin Dawei reconstructed this investigation process at the press conference.
Lin Dawei admitted that the prolonged investigation was related to the initial direction taken. He explained that an e-commerce order passes through multiple nodes, including the brand's operational computers, the order management system, and the 91APP platform itself. In the past, when investigating suspected order data leaks, the team habitually prioritized checking external nodes, a method that had proven effective over the years; thus, the same approach was used this time. However, the actual source of the intrusion was located within 91APP's internal systems. The team only grasped the attack trajectory after subsequently expanding the investigation to the internal environment. Lin Dawei acknowledged that the initial investigation direction was incorrect and that both internal and external environments should have been checked simultaneously from the start, rather than focusing primarily on external nodes.
According to the joint investigation by 91APP and Aoyi Smart Technology, attackers entered 91APP's internal network through an unpatched internal efficiency tool, Appsmith, and then obtained database keys from the code management platform GitLab, thereby illegally accessing an order database within Commerce Cloud. 91APP noted that the investigation found traces related to the ARTEX AI automated attack tool and attributed this incident to automated attacks using such tools. This incident not only involved third-party tools that were not updated in a timely manner but also included the issue of attackers gaining further access to databases after obtaining internal keys. 91APP stated in its investigation report that the failure of protection and patch management to keep pace with the speed of attacks is an area the company must reflect upon.
In response to this incident, 91APP stated that it has removed the exploited tools, changed system keys and passwords, readjusted GitLab permissions, isolated test and production environments, and restricted network connections between hosts and databases. Regarding future protection, 91APP proposed three major improvement directions: First, to promote a Zero Trust architecture by implementing micro-segmentation of networks and applications, enforcing least privilege, and conducting continuous verification to reduce the scope of access between different systems and lower the risk of lateral movement by attackers within the internal network. Second, to utilize AI to accelerate security detection and response speeds by continuously monitoring for anomalies, analyzing them, and automatically responding via AI, while also using AI to simulate attacks and proactively identify system vulnerabilities. Third, to introduce external security experts for continuous assessment, leveraging third-party independent testing, evaluation, and threat intelligence sharing to supplement potential blind spots in the internal perspective.