Quantitative investment literature has long evaluated whether a signal is worth pursuing using metrics such as alpha, the Sharpe ratio, and statistical significance. A new paper by Avramov, Bongaerts, Crego, and Kvaerner introduces an often-overlooked dimension: capacity—the maximum amount of capital a strategy can deploy before transaction costs erode its market-hedged returns. Using NYSE TAQ data from 2010 to 2023, they estimated spreads, price impact, and liquidity replenishment to calculate deployable capital for 35 characteristic-based anomalies and factors one by one.
The core finding is a severe disconnect between alpha rankings and capacity rankings. The two long legs with the highest gross alphas each support less than $2 billion in market-hedged capital, while strategies with significantly lower alpha in profitability and cash flow can support $20 billion to $33 billion. The profit-margin anomaly has roughly two-fifths the alpha of the highest five-day return strategy, yet its capacity is 97 times greater. For anyone actually allocating capital, this means that the most eye-catching signals in backtests are not necessarily the largest economic opportunities.
The differences in capacity stem primarily from price impact, which is driven by two portfolio characteristics: turnover and the liquidity of the underlying stocks. Short-term reversal strategies turn over 1.8 times per month, incurring 1.6% monthly impact costs at a $10 billion scale; the Amihud liquidity strategy hardly turns over (0.12 times per month), but because it holds illiquid stocks, it still incurs 1.2% monthly impact costs at the same scale. The paths differ, but the result is the same: costs eat away at alpha.
The paper also provides a lever with significant practical implications: rebalancing speed. When the adjustment coefficient τ is less than 1, exiting stocks that leave the target quintile does not involve immediate liquidation but rather a gradual reduction over subsequent months. This single change raises the median capacity of positive-capacity factors from $1.5 billion to $21 billion, a thirteenfold increase at the strategy level. The value-weighted machine-learning composite strategy expands its capacity from $177 million to $19 billion without any change to the signal itself. The rank correlation of capacity rankings is 0.93, indicating that slower rebalancing mainly amplifies scale without drastically altering relative ordering.
It is crucial to emphasize that these figures come entirely from the authors' own first-party estimates, based on a specific data window and specific assumptions about market hedging costs, and have not yet been independently replicated. The median factor capacity of $1.53 billion is in the same order of magnitude as the median hedge fund's net asset value of $1.1 billion; this comparison itself serves as a sobering reminder of scale constraints: most factor strategies are not frictionless at institutional sizes.
The practical implication for readers is: before deciding how much to allocate to an anomaly or factor, measure its trading capacity, rather than looking only at backtested returns. The gap between a niche $200 million strategy and a $20 billion institutional strategy is written in the liquidity of the stocks traded and in the speed of rebalancing.